

# **EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS (INDIAN AND WESTERN)**

**BA [Philosophy]  
First Semester  
Paper-I**

**[ENGLISH EDITION]**



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# SYLLABI-BOOK MAPPING TABLE

## Epistemology and Metaphysics (Indian and Western)

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### Syllabi

### Mapping in Book

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#### Unit-I

Carvaka (Perception, Refutation of Inference and other Pramanas) Nyaya (Perception: Nature, Definition and Classification, Sannikarsa, Laukika and Alaukika Pratyksa)

**Unit 1: Indian Epistemology  
(Pages 3-20)**

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#### Unit-II

Vaisesika Metaphysics (Padarthas: Samanya, Visesa, Samavaya, Abhava, Paramanuvada)

**Unit 2: Vaisesika Metaphysics  
(Pages 21-54)**

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#### Unit-III

Western Epistemology: Theories of Knowledge: (Empiricism, Rationalism and Criticism) Theories of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence and Pragmatic)

**Unit 3: Western Epistemology  
(Pages 55-69)**

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#### Unit-IV

Western Metaphysics: Idealism (Subjective and Objectives); Realism (Naïve Realism and Representative Realism), Substance (Empiricist and Rationalist view), Causality (Entailment theory and Regularity theory)

**Unit 4: Western Metaphysics  
(Pages 71-97)**

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# INTRODUCTION

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Philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge. It is the knowledge of the eternal and essential nature of things. Aristotle says that ‘Philosophy begins in wonder’ or man’s instinct of curiosity. Indian philosophy is one of the richest philosophical traditions of the world.

The Indian epistemological tradition comprises six important sources of knowledge. They are: perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), verbal testimony (*Sabda*), comparison (*upamana*), presupposition (*arthapatti*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*).

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with various theories of knowledge. It enquires into the origin of knowledge and the conditions of its validity. Indian epistemology is rich in terms of its content and logical reasoning. Systems of Indian philosophy may be broadly divided into Vedic and non-Vedic or orthodox and heterodox. The earliest literature of Indian thought can be traced to the Vedas. Each of the four Vedas contains four sections- the *Mantras* or *Samhitas*, the *Brahmanas*, the *Aranyakas* and the Upanishads.

Metaphysics can simply be defined as a branch of philosophy engaged in the study of ‘being as such’ or ‘the first cause of things’. In other words, it is that branch of philosophy which engages with the question: ‘what is there?’ Such expressions are derived from the works of Aristotle. Interestingly, the term ‘metaphysics’ has nothing to do with its subject matter. It was first used by one of the early editors of Aristotle’s work to represent his work which were put after his treatises on physics in the general collection of his works

This book, *Epistemology and Metaphysics (Indian and Western)*, has been designed keeping in mind the self-instruction mode format and follows a simple pattern, wherein each unit of the book begins with an *Introduction* to the topic followed by *Unit Objectives*. The content is then presented in a simple and easy-to-understand manner, and is interspersed with ‘*Check Your Progress*’ questions to test the reader’s understanding of the topic. A list of *Questions and Exercises* is also provided at the end of each unit, and includes short answer as well as long-answer questions. The *Summary* and *Key Terms* section are useful tools for students and are meant for effective recapitulation of the text.

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# UNIT 1 INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

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## Structure

- 1.0 Introduction
- 1.1 Unit Objectives
- 1.2 Epistemology and Pramanas
- 1.3 Cārvāka School
  - 1.3.1 Cārvāka View of Perception
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- 1.4 Nyaya School
  - 1.4.1 Pratyaksa
- 1.5 Summary
- 1.6 Key Terms
- 1.7 Answers to ‘Check Your Progress’
- 1.8 Questions and Exercises
- 1.9 Further Reading

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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

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Philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge. It is the knowledge of the eternal and essential nature of things. Aristotle says that ‘Philosophy begins in wonder’ or man’s instinct of curiosity. All search of knowledge originates in our instinct of curiosity. The Greek thinkers wondered at the phenomena of the world and tried to explain them by a fundamental principle or principles. Due to the nature of wondering, man desires to know the truth of things. Leibnitz says, ‘The knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to knowledge of ourselves and of God.’ Hence, we can say that philosophy signifies a natural and necessary urge in human beings to know themselves and the world in which they live and have their being.

In philosophy, the concepts with which we approach the world themselves become the topic of enquiry. Aristotle considers philosophy as ‘the first and last science’—the first science because it is logically presupposed by every other science, the last because it deals with reality in its ultimate principles and coordinates them with one another and gives a rational conception of the whole world.

The term philosophy has its roots in Greece and in Greek language. It is a combination of two words, ‘Philos’ and ‘Sophia’, which means love and wisdom. Thus, the etymological meaning of ‘philosophy’ is ‘love of wisdom or learning.’ Although philosophy is etymologically defined as ‘love of wisdom,’ the meaning of wisdom is to be taken in a wider sense. Philosophy is the understanding that enables a person to open out to various realms of knowledge. It helps man to go beyond the limiting boundaries of fragmentation. Thus, the scope of philosophy embraces the whole of reality. Everything is looked at in their ultimate cause and principles.

Every individual has a philosophy of life and it gives shape to his/her life. It is one’s philosophy of life that moulds one’s attitudes and convictions. According to some scholars, the greatest advantages of philosophy consist in its ability to make

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the human mind sharp and disciplined. It enables a person to have the clarity of concepts and precision of expression. Philosophy is the interpretation of life, its value and meaning. It is an enquiry into the source and destiny of life. It investigates the nature of supreme norms, ideals or values of life and the relation of these values to reality. In short, philosophy enables people to live a life of existential depth, moral integrity and religious conviction.

So we can say that science is knowledge of facts but philosophy is an insight into the nature of facts. Science gives a partial explanation of our experience.

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### 1.1 UNIT OBJECTIVES

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After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Discuss the views of Carvaka regarding perception and inference
- State the meaning of *laukika* and *alaukika pratyaksa*
- Discuss beliefs and views of the Nyaya School

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### 1.2 EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRAMANAS

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Epistemology is a systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science. The means of knowledge or *pramanas* which are accepted by the schools of Indian thought include – *pratyaksa*, *anumana*, *upamana*, *sabda*, *arthapatti abhava*, *sambhava* and *aitihya*. It is in the work of the commentators on the Mimamsa Sutra, that we find the origin and development of the theory of knowledge according to the Mimamsa School. Of these commentaries, the *Sabara-bhasya* of Sabaraswamin is the oldest work which is available now, though it is not the first commentary on Mimamsa Sutra. Sabaraswamin was followed by Kumarila and Prabhakara, who further developed the epistemological doctrines of the Mimamsa School. In their epistemological views, we find great influence of Nyaya Vaisesika and Buddhist schools. According to Prabhakara, the word *pramana* means ‘valid’ knowledge and not the means of valid knowledge. Recollection is regarded as invalid knowledge by him in as much as it stands in need of a previous cognition. The Bhatta School, on the other hand, defines *pramana* as that knowledge which is instrumental in enabling us to apprehend the ‘special luminosity’ or *prakasavisesa* which abides in the objects cognized.

Among the *pramanas* accepted by schools of Indian thought, both Kumarila and Prabhakara reject implication or *sambhava* and tradition or *aitihya* as means of knowledge. Kumarila accepts all the other six *pramanas* including *pratyaksa* or perception, *anumana* or inference, *upamana* or comparison, *sabda* or testimony, *arthapatti* or presumption and *anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension. However, Prabhakara rejects *anupalabdhi* also a distinct source of knowledge.

#### 1. Pratyaksa or Perception

As a *pramana* being primary and fundamental to all sources of knowledge, it is enumerated first in order, in all systems of Indian philosophy and taken as an

independent means of knowledge as the knowledge produced by it. Those systems of Indian philosophy which recognize other means of valid knowledge besides perception subscribe that perception is the ultimate ground of all other means of knowledge. All other sources of knowledge presuppose perception. Perception is a source of cognition as well as a type of true cognition. The essential character of perception is the contact between senses and the object of perception. It is that apprehension which is produced by the contact of the sense organs of man with something which exists. Internal contents of human cognition like pain and pleasure are cognized through the mind and this is called mental perception.

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### 2. Anumana or Inference

The Sanskrit word *anumana* means after knowledge. It is a source in which knowledge is obtained after proof. So knowledge derived through *anumana* is not direct. It makes use of previous knowledge obtained from other sources of knowledge like perception and testimony and enables us to explore further knowledge. In Indian philosophy, inference is of two kinds—*Svarthanumana* or inference for one's own sake and *Pararthanumana* or inference for the sake of another. When inference is used for oneself, the propositions are not well structured since its primary aim is the acquisition of personal knowledge without error. However, inference for others or *Pararthanumana* has to be well structured because it is used to convince others of the truth. Hence, the former is not expressed in the form of a syllogistic argument. The latter is expressed in a syllogistic form so that it helps to direct the mind of the listener to think in the required manner. In Sabarabhasya inference is defined as, 'the cognition of an object not in direct contact and forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one of which is directly apprehended.'

### 3. Sabda or Testimony

Testimony or *sabda pramana* is an important source of knowledge. Indian epistemology not only recognize *sabda* that is hearing the utterance of a competent speaker as a *pramana* but also as the decisive source of our cognitions about all those matters that transcend the limits of possible sensory experience. Our experience shows that the major part of a person's stock of knowledge about the world is acquired from oral or written testimony of other people. Testimony has been recognized as an independent source of knowledge by almost all schools of Indian philosophy. Gautama defines *sabda* as *apta-vakya*. Scriptural testimony is the cognition of an object not in sense-contact but by means of knowledge of words. The different systems in India give different explanations of *sabda*.

### 4. Upamana or Comparison

In *upamana*, knowledge of an object is determined by comparing it with other similar kinds of objects. Hence, it is regarded as an analogy.

### 5. Arthapatti or Presumption

The term *arthapatti* is derived from two words *artha* and '*apathi* which means fact and *kalpana* or supposition respectively. Thus etymologically speaking, *arthapatti* is that knowledge which resolves the conflict between two facts. It

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entails a presupposition which solves the problem that occurred between two facts. Through this *pramana* we discover a fact as a result of a contradiction between two facts already known to be well established. Presumption or *arthapatti* is the surmise about an object on the ground that something which has been or heard cannot be possible otherwise. It is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts.

### 6. Anupalabdhi or Non-apprehension

Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. To perceive the non-existence of a particular object in a given situation or place is known as *anupalabdhi*. For example – an umbrella which is expected to be in a particular corner of a room is not seen there. We know about the non-existence of the umbrella through a separate *pramana* and that is, *anupalabdhi*.

#### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. What is perception?
2. Define *anumana*.

## 1.3 CĀRVĀKA SCHOOL

Brahaspathi is regarded as the traditional founder of this school. His *sutras* have unfortunately perished. Sometimes, Brahaspati is equated with the teacher of the Gods who propagated materialism among the *Asuras* so that they might be ruined.

Cārvāka, is also said to be the chief disciple of Brahaspati and according to another view he is the founder of this school. According to still another view, Cārvāka is not a proper name. It is in fact, a common name given to a materialist and it signifies a person who believes in 'eat, drink and be merry.' The root '*caru*' means to eat or a person who eats up his own words or who eats up all moral and ethical considerations.

It also means a person who is 'sweet tongued' (*caruvak*) which shows the superficial attractiveness of the doctrine. Another name for Cārvāka is '*Lokayata*' which means a common man that is, a man of low and unrefined taste.

**Metaphysics:** According to the Cārvāka, the whole world consists of four elements and not of five. These elements are earth, water, fire and air which are perceived through the senses of smell, taste, sight and touch. He rejects the fifth, the ether or space because it is not perceived but inferred. The world of perception is the only world that exists. Hence, soul, God and the 'life hereafter' are rejected. Everything that exists, including the mind, is due to a particular combination of the above four elements. The elements are eternal, but their combinations undergo production and dissolution. This view we see is in sharp contrast to Vedanta which insists that reality lies beyond sense and perception. The physical body is the self of an individual.

There is no mind, consciousness, no soul, over and above the physical body. We do not perceive mind or soul. Hence, they are unreal. Consciousness is regarded as a mere by product or epiphenomenon of matter. It is produced when the elements combine in a certain proportion. It is always found associated with the body and vanishes when the body disintegrates. Chandradhar Sharma, a writer and scholar of Hindi, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Pali, aptly pointed out that, 'Consciousness is regarded as a mere product of matter. It is produced when the elements combine in a certain proportion. It is always found associated with the body and vanishes when the body disintegrates.' The Cārvāka position is vehemently criticized and it was proved that consciousness is not at all a property of the body.

**Ethics:** The ethics of Cārvāka is the ethics of pleasure seeking. Since the physical body makes up one's own self, it is useless to try to attain any world other than the present world, any fruit other than the fruit of maximum pleasure here and now. Out of the four human values — *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kama* and *Moksa* – Cārvāka regarded only *kama* or sensual pleasure as their aim. *Artha* or wealth is regarded as the means to attain *kama*. There is no room in this philosophy for the spiritual values of *dharma* and *moksa*. Thus, *dharma* and *moksa* are altogether rejected. The main cause for the downfall of the Cārvāka might be because of this denial of human values which make life worth living. The extreme materialism of the Cārvāka advocated irresponsibility and confusion by preaching a life of reckless pleasure seeking. Life without values is the animal life and not human life. The only contribution of the Cārvāka system to Indian thought lies in the fact that it has awakened the Indian thinkers from their dogmatic ideas and enabled Indian philosophy in general to become self-critical.

### 1.3.1 Cārvāka View of Perception

According to Cārvāka *pratyaksa* or perception is the only *pramana* or the only source of valid knowledge. In other words, Cārvāka supported the empirical theory of knowledge. Cārvāka has stated that inference and testimony (*sabda*) cannot give valid knowledge.

'Pratyaksa (perception) as a source of valid knowledge is universally accepted by all the schools of Indian system both *Astika* and *Nastika*.' Thus, Cārvāka regarded *pratyaksa* as the only means of valid knowledge.

According to Cārvāka, knowledge that is directly collected by the sense-organs is called perception. 'What is arrived at by means of direct perception is the truth. That alone exists. What is not perceivable is non-existent, for the simple reason that it is not perceived.' Perception is of two kinds—external perception and internal perception. Perceptual knowledge, collected by five external sense-organs such as eyes, ear, and nose are called external perceptions and knowledge such as pleasure, and pain collected by mind, the internal organs are called internal perceptions. Therefore, the Cārvāka holds that perceptible world is the only reality.

### 1.3.2 Refutation of Inference

Cārvāka rejects inference (*anumana*) as dependable source of knowledge. It is said that they simply accept perception as a source of knowledge (*pramana*). If inference

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is said to be regarded as a pramana, it must yield knowledge about which we can have no doubt and which must be true to reality.

Inference is said to be a mere leap in the dark. But according to Jainas, inference cannot fulfill these conditions. In inference we proceed from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true.

A general proposition may be true in things that are perceived, but there is no guarantee that it will be true even in unperceived cases. After perceiving smoke in a distant mountain we infer that there is fire in the mountain. But this is not certain knowledge. Some logicians like the Naiyayikas maintain that the inference of something unperceived (fire) from something perceived (smoke) is justified by the previous knowledge of the relationship between fire and smoke. But Cārvāka argues that this contention will be valid and true only if the major premises stating the natural relationship between the smoke and the fire were beyond doubt.

But since it is not possible for us to perceive all cases of fire and smoke in the world, no universal relation (vyapti) between smoke and fire can be established.

It is true that for knowledge we often depend on inference, and may give valid knowledge. Sometimes inference leads to wrong knowledge also, therefore, inference cannot be regarded as pramana. According to Cārvāka, there is no logical ground or justification for believing in anything simply said by another person. If this is the case then one will have to believe in many absurd and fictitious objects that might be irrelevant. If, however, sabda or testimony is constituted by the statement of a trustworthy person, it is only a case of inference from the character of a man to the truth of his assertion. But inference cannot be accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Views of Cārvāka has been criticized by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference.

### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

3. Who is regarded as the founder of Cārvāka School?
4. What is the basic philosophy of Cārvāka regarding the five elements of the world?
5. What ethics did Cārvāka believe in?

## 1.4 NYAYA SCHOOL

The Nyāya School of philosophy was propounded by Sage Gotama (also known as Gautama or Akshapada). The Nyāya philosophy is sometimes also known as Tarkashastra, Anvikshiki, Akshapada Vidya or the Nyāya Vidya. The philosophy of this school is primarily concerned with the means to achieve true knowledge of the reality (metaphysics) and an impartial analysis of the conditions required for the correct thinking (epistemology). The study of this school is particularly useful for inculcating the caliber for logical analysis and developing critical stance in the students.

The Nyāya epistemology is different from the western epistemology in the sense that in western context, the discipline of logic is concerned primarily with the propositions (or the sentences), but in Indian context, the Nyāya deals not only with the propositions but also with what it calls jñāna (by jñāna, it refers to the particular instances of cognition). The jñāna itself is not a linguistic manifestation and thinkers have differed widely on its English translation. Sometimes it has been rendered as knowledge, sometimes cognition, sometimes also as awareness, apprehension or judgment.

The term jñāna has been used in a wider sense by other Indian philosophical systems such as Sāṅkhya or Vedānta. Therefore, Sage Gotama emphasized that jñāna, buddhi, apprehension or instances of cognition are different names for identical term. So, in the Nyāya system, to be conscious of something and to cognize means to have a jñāna of something. There is no pure consciousness as such. The self or the conscious subject is accepted as that subject which has cognition or jñāna. This will lead to the inevitable conclusion that jñāna is something associated with the self (in fact, it is also called the *guna* of the self) and this self is its locus or the substratum. Thus, the Naiyāyikas epistemologically believe that this cognition always refers, besides itself to some other object. However, they do not believe that it brings about some fresh property of knownness (*jnātata*) in the concerned object. It is to be noted here that the Naiyāyikas illustrate some non-physical acts like inferring, perceiving, wondering, doubting, remembering, dreaming and even guessing under the term jñāna: However, they insist that the other non-physical acts like willing, hoping, desiring, suffering and rejoicing cannot be included in jñāna.

The Naiyāyikas emphasize that the object-directedness, that is the property of being inseparable associated with some or the other object (*savisayaktva*) is the distinctive trait of the jñāna. Some may doubt (like Gadādhara) that this property is not peculiar to jñāna but to some other non-physical act. However, the Naiyāyikas emphasize that these other non-physical acts such as desire and aversion (*raga evam dvesa*) refer to the object indirectly. This means that they have to depend on some or the other kind of jñāna or cognition for its ground. Therefore, the intentionality (*visayatā*) related to such non-physical act is actually borrowed from a jñāna, therefore only jñāna has the primary (or the unborrowed) intentionality. Such a distinction is extremely significant for the Naiyāyikas and cannot be avoided.

We find comparable traits if we analyze the concept of jñāna in the western context. For example, Franz Brentano has distinguished our mental phenomena such as thinking, believing from the physical acts such as running or writing. He introduced the concept of 'intentional inexistence' as the means of distinguishing the mental phenomena. The concept of jñāna as the mental phenomena as opposed to a physical phenomenon seems comparable to Brentano's view though with considerable contrasts of *visayatā*.

It may be said that in Indian tradition, epistemology and logic have always been inseparable and actually developed as a distinct discipline with a unique system of epistemology and metaphysics. The discussion on a *pramāna* (epistemology is the term roughly used to mean 'pramāna sastra') holds the central position in Nyāya school and this school increased the interest in the methodology of the exact

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formulation of theories, definition-formation up to a great extent. They introduced specific techniques by which the implicit argument could be presented with great accuracy and precision. In this way, this is the most important philosophical school which made attempts to remove the inexactitude and vagueness of any given theory.

The whole of Nyāya philosophy is systematically divided into four significant theories:

- Theory of knowledge
- Theory of physical world
- Theory of self and liberation
- Theory of God

It is to be noted here that this system in itself is a detailed account of sixteen philosophical topics (called the padārthas):

- Pramāna (way of knowing)
- Prameya (knowable object)
- Samsayā (doubt, state of uncertainty)
- Prayojana (end-in-view)
- Dristānt (example of undisputed fact)
- Siddhānta (a truly accepted doctrine)
- Avayava (member of the syllogism)
- Tarka (hypothetical argument)
- Nirnaya (certain knowledge)
- Vāda (discussion)
- Jalpa (wrangling aimed at victory)
- Vitanda (debate only to refute others' position)
- Hetvābhāsa (fallacy of inference)
- Chala (unfair reply)
- Jāti (reply based on false analogy)
- Nigrahasthāna (ground of defeat in a debate)

The Nyāya philosophy is accepted as a school of *logical realism*, which means belief in the existence of the physical objects independent of the knowledge or its relationship with the mind. This view is just opposite to the idealism which believes that the objects exist only as they are related to some or other mind. The realistic view of Nyāya is not grounded on testimony or faith, but on logical reasoning and critical stance. Such a theory of reality or metaphysics naturally presumes a theory of knowledge or epistemology. The Nyāya realism is grounded in its epistemology, which forms its logical foundation.

**Classification of knowledge:** According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge (jñāna) is defined as the manifestation of objects. They take knowledge and cognition in the



same sense. The knowledge manifests its objects in the same way as the flame of a candle reveals the things. Such knowledge is considered to be of two kinds:

- Presentative cognition (anubhava)
- Representative cognition (smṛiti or memory)

Each of these two may be valid (yathārtha) or invalid (ayāthartha).

Pramā is the name given to the valid presentative knowledge (yathārtha anubhava). It is divided into perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Apramā is the non-valid presentative knowledge (ayathārtha anubhava). It is divided into doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya or bhrama) and hypothetical argument (tarka). Pramā is considered to be unerring and certain (yathārtha and asandigdha) and non-reproductive in nature. For example, the visual perception of the book in front of me is pramā, as in it, the book is presented to me directly as it is and I am quite certain about the correctness of my knowledge. It is to be noted, here, that smṛiti (memory) is a mere reproduction of the previous cognition and is, therefore, not a pramā.

Any doubtful knowledge is not a Pramā, but when we perceive a snake in a rope, we are certain (have no doubt) that the snake is not real. The perception is erroneous here, as it is not the yathārtha anubhava (true cognition) of the object i.e. the snake.

Even a tarka (argument) is not a Pramā as it does not provide us the knowledge of the object. This is because any argument starts with 'if' which does not provide us knowledge of the object, but only confirms our previous inference. For example, to infer the existence of fire from smoke does not mean the acceptance of the knowledge of fire as a real fact, but only the confirmation from our previous experience of fire from the smoke.

Distinction between pramā and apramā: According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is true only and only when it corresponds to the nature of its objects, otherwise it is false. For example, my knowledge of the rose as fragrant is true only if there is really a fragrance in the rose, but my impression of lotus as fragrant is false as fragrance is not really associated with lotus. But then, the obvious question would be: How do we know (or test) the truth or falsity of our knowledge? According to the Naiyāyikas, the truth or falsity of knowledge consists in its correspondence or non-correspondence to the concerned fact. This test consists in inferential process and depends upon the success or failure of our practical activities concerned with the object (pravṛttisamarthya or pravṛttisamvada). For example, if I feel the need for more salt in my food and after sprinkling some more salt, my food tastes much better, then my previous perception of salt was true. But in case, the powdered white substance I sprinkled over my food led to an awkward sweetening in the food, I come to know that my previous perception of the powdered white substance as salt was false and it was actually not salt, but powdered sugar. As a result, it may be said that pramā (true knowledge) consists of successful practical activity whereas apramā (false knowledge) ends in unsuccessful result.

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As we have seen in the above mentioned discussion, the Nyāya metaphysics is directly based on Nyāya epistemology. The Naiyāyikas believe in four different and independent sources of true knowledge:

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- Pratyakca (perception)
- Anumana (inference)
- Upaman (comparison)
- Sabda (testimony)

### 1.4.1 Pratyaksa

Generally, we believe that whatever is given in our perception has to be true. That is why, no one doubts the truth of what he receives by his sense-perception, so most of the times, it is unnecessary to analyze the conditions and definition of perception as valid source of knowledge. In this context, Nyāya system seems to be more rigorous and critical than the western and has presented an elaborate and precise analysis of perception (in the same way as the western systems have analyzed the inference).

#### Sannikarsh

The Naiyāyikas define perception as a true, unerring and certain cognition obtained from sense-object contact (sannikarsh). For example, I am sure of the object in front of me as the book, because I have obtained the perception of the book by the direct contact of my eyes with the book. But the perception of a far-off object may be uncertain and dubious cognition, e.g. I may not be sure whether 'the distant human-like figure is that of a man or a monkey then it cannot be a true perception. Even the prominent example of perceiving a snake in a rope seems certain yet false, and is therefore not a valid perception. This definition is well-taken by various schools of Indian as well as Western philosophy. Some systems like Vedāntins and a few Naiyāyikās, however, discard this definition as there may be some examples where perception may be produced even without sense-object contact. For example, I might see the snake in a rope even when there is not and therefore, no snake-eye contact (sannikarsh) and if we may be permitted to take this argument to the next level, God perceives everything but as we are told, God has no senses. Also, our mental states e.g. feelings of happiness and sorrow are cognized directly without the aid of our senses. Therefore, the sense-object contact cannot be accepted as the distinguishing mark for our perception.

Despite all this, it may be asserted that every perception is necessarily associated with a feeling of *immediacy* (directness) of knowledge achieved by it. Thereby, we are said to have a perception only when we know the perceived object immediately. It means we perceive the said object without the aid or assistance of any earlier knowledge or any inferential process. For example, when one looks at the sun at noon one immediately perceives the glare without the means of inference (or reasoning). For this perception, neither we have sufficient time to think or reason, nor is there any requirement for it. It just happens *directly* and *immediately*. That is why, some thinkers give the definition of perception as 'direct cognition' (sākshāt pratiti), though they do accept that in almost every case, the perception is conditioned by sense-object contact.

As a source of knowledge, the classification of perception can be made on different grounds as follows:

- **Based on how our senses connect with the objects:** There are two kinds of perception—*laukika pratyakca* (ordinary perception) and *alaukika pratyakca* (extraordinary perception). When there is ordinary contact of the sense with the object presented to the sense, then the perception is called *laukika pratyakca*. When the sense ordinarily does not come in contact with the object, but it is conveyed to the sense extraordinarily through some other medium, then the perception is called *alaukika pratyakca*.
- **Based on the nature of senses:** There may, again, be two different kinds of perception—*bāhya* (external perception) and *mānasa* (internal perception). *Bāhya* is produced by our external senses of touch, taste, smell, vision and hearing and *mānasa* is produced by the mind's connection with the psychical states or conditions.

### Laukika Pratyaksa (Ordinary Perception)

There are six different kinds of *laukika pratyaksa*:

- *Cāksusa* (visual)
- *Sparsana* (tactual)
- *Srautra* (auditory)
- *ghrānaja* (olfactory)
- *Rasanā* (gustatory)
- *Mānasa* (mental or internal)

It is related to physical qualities and these qualities are constituted by the physical elements of the same nature. That is why, most of the times we name the sense-organ specifically on the basis of physical quality sensed by it (this nomenclature is based on the law of 'like perceives like'). *Mānasa* is the only internal sense organ which has the capacity to perceive various qualities of the soul, such as *sukha* (pleasure), *dukha* (pain), *iccha* (desire), *dvesa* (aversion), *prayatna* (willingness), *sanjnāna* (cognition). It is totally devoid of the *bhutas* (material-physical elements). It functions as the central organ working commonly in various kinds of knowledge. Thereby, it is not confined to the knowledge of the specific class of things or qualities. The *Naiyāyikas* call mind as the *antarindriya* (internal sense) and their view is accepted by several schools of Indian philosophy like *Mimamsakas*, *Sankhyas*, but not *Vedantins*.

### Stages of Laukika Pratyaksa

The *Naiyāyikas* propose another classification of the ordinary perception in two kinds. This classification is concerned with the process of the development of our perceptual knowledge:

1. **Nirvikalpaka:** This is the primary but indeterminate cognition of the objects and its various characteristics, without any judgment to interconnect them. For example, when we look at an orange for the first time, there is a contact

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between our eyes and the orange, we apprehend something, e.g. a particular shape, size, colour, etc., but at this stage, we do not conceive it as an orange, yellow, round, tangy, edible, etc. Another example might be when we are so engrossed in our thoughts that we sit on the dining table and finish our dinner without realizing that there is no salt in the food. It cannot be said that we did not taste the food but the complete perception cannot be explained on the basis of this act. This is the *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception of the object without any explicit interrelation or characterization.

2. **Savikalpaka:** This is the determinate and predicative judgment about the perception. While *nirvikalpaka* is the primary cognition of the object and its characteristics as such, *savikalpaka* is the recognition of its nature. Here, not only we cognize the unrelated elements as such, but we also explicitly relate them. For example, when I pass the judgment within myself while looking at the orange that 'this is an orange, this is yellow, round, tangy and edible', the existing fact 'this' becomes the subject of the proposition and the qualities like orangeness, roundness, tanginess are related to it as the predicates. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that while *nirvikalpaka* is an indeterminate apprehension, *savikalpaka* is a determinate and predicative judgment. It is to be noted here that no *savikalpaka* perception of an object is possible without an earlier *nirvikalpaka* perception of the same object, as we cannot possibly cognize the unrelated elements as related to each other, unless we first know these unrelated elements as such. Jayant Bhatt is of the opinion that *nirvikalpaka* apprehends substance, qualities, actions and universals as unique, separate and indistinct 'something', while *savikalpaka* apprehends all of them together and with a proper name. We may say that *nirvikalpaka* is the first and *savikalpaka* is the second mode or stage in the process of perception. For example, unless I perceive an orange, yellowness, roundness, tanginess etc. separately, I cannot get the complete knowledge of it as the orange.
3. **Pratyabhijna:** Some thinkers also accept *pratyabhijna* as a kind of ordinary perception. It is the recognition of some object in its very literal sense. *Pratyabhijna* is the cognition of the object as that which was cognized before. Here, we immediately come to know that the thing which we cognize here-and-now is the same as that which was cognized before. For example, when a student says this must be the same teacher who taught me ten years back', then he is simply recognizing the object as previously known. It is to be noted here that the differentiation established between the *nirvikalpaka*, *savikalpaka* and *pratyabhijna* have not been recognized by all the systems of Indian philosophy in the same sense. The Sankhya, Mimamsa and the Vaisesika system approve this Naiyayika distinction, but the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedantins reject it and hold different views.

### Alaukika Pratyaksa

According to the Naiyāyikas, the extraordinary perception is, again, believed to be of three different kinds as follows:


1. **Samanyalaskshana:** The direct perception of the universal class is the medium through which we perceive all the particular members of that class.

**NOTES**

To perceive a class is to perceive all the members of the class so far as they all are possessed of that distinct and universal class. For example, when we get the knowledge that ‘all cows have two horns’, then we are at least not perceiving all the cows in the world, neither in the present, nor in the past or future, but still (since all cows are not present to our senses) this is because we presume some knowledge about the universal class of cowness (samanya: gotva). This perception of the class of cows due to the perception of samanya is known as samanyalaksana and is considered as an extraordinary perception because of its apparent distinction from our ordinary perception.

2. **Jñānalaksana:** The direct perception of the quality brought about by the sense-organ not ordinarily capable of perceiving it and not present at the moment is called jñānalaksana. For example, our ordinary expressions such as a ‘the rose looks fragrant’, ‘the sweet looks delicious’ or ‘the ice looks cold’ are impossible to be perceived ordinarily, but here they are directly perceived through the revived past experience of the fragrance, deliciousness or coldness which is extraordinary in the sense that it is brought about by the sense organ not capable of receiving it. It is to be noted here that the Naiyāyikas accept illusion (e.g. the perception of the snake in a rope) also as an instance of jñānalaksana.
3. **Yogaja:** The intuitive perception of all the objects, no matter how small or hidden, at all the times- past or future, by those who generate such a capability in mind by committed meditation (yogabhyasa) is called yogaja or the intuitive perception. Such extraordinary perception is spontaneous, consistent and available only to those who attain spiritual perfection (yukta).

The Naiyāyika theory of perception may be diagrammatically represented as follows:



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**CHECK YOUR PROGRESS**

6. Who propounded the Nyāya School of philosophy?
7. How is Nyāya epistemology different from Western epistemology?
8. Name the four theories of Nyāya philosophy.

**1.5 SUMMARY**

- Epistemology is a systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science.
- The means of knowledge or *pramanas* which are accepted by the schools of Indian thought include – *pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda, arthapatti abhava, sambhava and aitihya*.
- As a *pramana* being primary and fundamental to all sources of knowledge, it is enumerated first in order, in all systems of Indian philosophy and taken as an independent means of knowledge as the knowledge produced by it.
- The Sanskrit word *anumana* means after knowledge. It is a source in which knowledge is obtained after proof. So knowledge derived through *anumana* is not direct. It makes use of previous knowledge obtained from other sources of knowledge like perception and testimony and enables us to explore further knowledge.
- In Indian philosophy, inference is of two kinds: *Svarthanumana* or inference for one's own sake and *Pararthanumana* or inference for the sake of another.
- Testimony or *sabda pramana* is an important source of knowledge. Indian epistemology not only recognize *sabda* that is hearing the utterance of a competent speaker as a *pramana* but also as the decisive source of our cognitions about all those matters that transcend the limits of possible sensory experience.
- In *upamana*, knowledge of an object is determined by comparing it with other similar kinds of objects. Hence, it is regarded as an analogy.
- The term *arthapatti* is derived from two words *artha* and '*apathi* which means fact and *kalpana* or supposition respectively. Thus etymologically speaking, *arthapatti* is that knowledge which resolves the conflict between two facts.
- Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. To perceive the non-existence of a particular object in a given situation or place is known as *anupalabdhi*.
- Cārvāka, is also said to be the chief disciple of Brahaspati and according to another view he is the founder of this school. According to still another view, Cārvāka is not a proper name. It is in fact, a common name given to a materialist and it signifies a person who believes in 'eat, drink and be merry.'

- According to the Cārvāka, the whole world consists of four elements and not of five. These elements are earth, water, fire and air which are perceived through the senses of smell, taste, sight and touch. He rejects the fifth, the ether or space because it is not perceived but inferred.
- The ethics of Cārvāka is the ethics of pleasure seeking. Since the physical body makes up one's own self, it is useless to try to attain any world other than the present world, any fruit other than the fruit of maximum pleasure here and now. Out of the four human values — *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kama* and *Moksa*.
- According to Cārvāka *pratyaksa* or perception is the only *pramana* or the only source of valid knowledge. In other words, Cārvāka supported the empirical theory of knowledge. Cārvāka has stated that inference and testimony (*sabda*) cannot give valid knowledge.
- According to Cārvāka, knowledge that is directly collected by the sense-organs is called perception.
- According to Cārvāka, there is no logical ground or justification for believing in anything simply said by another person. If this is the case then one will have to believe in many absurd and fictitious objects that might be irrelevant.
- The Nyāya School of philosophy was propounded by Sage Gotama (also known as Gautama or Akshapada). The Nyāya philosophy is sometimes also known as Tarkashastra, Anvikshiki, Akshapada Vidya or the Nyāya Vidya.
- The Nyāya epistemology is different from the western epistemology in the sense that in western context, the discipline of logic is concerned primarily with the propositions (or the sentences), but in Indian context, the Nyāya deals not only with the propositions but also with what it calls *jnāna* (by *jnāna*, it refers to the particular instances of cognition).
- The term *jnāna* has been used in a wider sense by other Indian philosophical systems such as Sāṅkhya or Vedānta. Therefore, Sage Gotama emphasized that *jnāna*, *buddhi*, apprehension or instances of cognition are different names for identical term.
- The whole of Nyāya philosophy is systematically divided into four significant theories:
  - o Theory of knowledge
  - o Theory of physical world
  - o Theory of self and liberation
  - o Theory of God
- The Nyāya philosophy is accepted as a school of *logical realism*, which means belief in the existence of the physical objects independent of the knowledge or its relationship with the mind.
- According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge (*jnāna*) is defined as the manifestation of objects. They take knowledge and cognition in the same sense. The knowledge manifests its objects in the same way as the flame of a candle reveals the things.

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- Pramā is the name given to the valid presentative knowledge (yathārtha anubhava). It is divided into perception, inference, comparison and testimony.
- The Naiyāyikas define perception as a true, unerring and certain cognition obtained from sense-object contact (sannikarsh).
- We are said to have a perception only when we know the perceived object immediately. It means we perceive the said object without the aid or assistance of any earlier knowledge or any inferential process.
- There are two kinds of perception—*laukika pratyakca* (ordinary perception) and *alaukika pratyakca* (extraordinary perception).
- There are six different kinds of laukika pratyakca:
  - o Cāksusa (visual)
  - o Sparsana (tactual)
  - o Srautra (auditory)
  - o ghrānaja (olfactory)
  - o Rasanā (gustatory)
  - o Mānasa (mental or internal)

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### 1.6 KEY TERMS

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- **Epistemology:** It is a systematic reflection concerning knowledge which takes knowledge itself as the object of science.
- **Perception:** It is a source of cognition as well as a type of true cognition. Perception is the contact between senses and the object of perception.
- **Pramā:** It is the name given to the valid presentative knowledge.

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### 1.7 ANSWERS TO ‘CHECK YOUR PROGRESS’

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1. Perception is a source of cognition as well as a type of true cognition. The essential character of perception is the contact between senses and the object of perception.
2. The Sanskrit word *anumana* means after knowledge. It is a source in which knowledge is obtained after proof. So knowledge derived through *anumana* is not direct. It makes use of previous knowledge obtained from other sources of knowledge like perception and testimony and enables us to explore further knowledge.
3. Brahaspathi is regarded as the traditional founder of Cārvāka School.
4. According to the Cārvāka, the whole world consists of four elements and not five. These elements are earth, water, fire and air which are perceived through the senses of smell, taste, sight and touch. He rejects the fifth, the ether or space because it is not perceived but inferred. The world of perception is the only world that exists.



5. The ethics of Cārvāka is the ethics of pleasure seeking. Out of the four human values — *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kama* and *Moksa* – Cārvāka regarded only *kama* or sensual pleasure as their aim. *Artha* or wealth is regarded as the means to attain *kama*. There is no room in this philosophy for the spiritual values of *dharma* and *moksa*.
6. The Nyāya School of philosophy was propounded by Sage Gotama (also known as Gautama or Akshapada).
7. The Nyāya epistemology is different from the western epistemology in the sense that in western context, the discipline of logic is concerned primarily with the propositions (or the sentences), but in Indian context, the Nyāya deals not only with the propositions but also with what it calls *jnāna*.
8. The whole of Nyāya philosophy is systematically divided into four significant theories:
  - Theory of knowledge
  - Theory of physical world
  - Theory of self and liberation
  - Theory of God

## NOTES

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## 1.8 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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### Short-Answer Questions

1. Write short notes on the following:
  - (a) Pramā
  - (b) Prameya
  - (c) Pramāna
  - (d) Pramānashāstra
  - (e) Sannikarsh
  - (f) Yathārtha anubhava
2. What was the view of Cārvāka on inference?
3. Name the different types of perception according to Nyāya.
4. What is Alaukika Pratyaksa?

### Long-Answer Questions

1. Discuss the classification of perception and its grounds.
2. Discuss the views of Cārvāka on perception.
3. What are the three kinds of extraordinary perception? Explain with suitable examples.
4. Critically analyse Cārvāka philosophy.
5. Discuss the different stages of Laukika Pratyaksa.

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## 1.9 FURTHER READING

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### NOTES

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## UNIT 2 VAISESIKA METAPHYSICS

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### Structure

- 2.0 Introduction
- 2.1 Unit Objectives
- 2.2 Astika and Nastika Schools of Thought
- 2.3 Prasastapadacarya: Padarthadharmasamgraha
- 2.4 Uddesa of Six Padarthas and Pariksha
  - 2.4.1 Types of Quality
  - 2.4.2 Types of Motion
  - 2.4.3 Dravya: The Substance
  - 2.4.4 Karma or Action
- 2.5 Samanya, Vishesha and Samavaya
- 2.6 Summary
- 2.7 Key Terms
- 2.8 Answers to 'Check Your Progress'
- 2.9 Questions and Exercises
- 2.10 Further Reading

### NOTES

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## 2.0 INTRODUCTION

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The Vaisesika system was founded by Kanada. It is so named in view of the fact that 'visesasa' as a category of knowledge has been elaborately discussed in it. The founder of this philosophy, as per belief, was surnamed 'Kanada' as he led the life of an ascetic and lived on grains of corn gleaned from the field. He was also named Uluka. So the Vaisesika philosophy is also known the Kanada or Aulukya system. The first systematic work of this philosophy is the Vaisesika- sutra of Kanada. It is divided into ten *adhyayas* or books, each insisting of two *ahnikas* or seconds.

Prasastapada's *Padarthadharmasamgraha* usually known as the Bhasya, reads like an independent exposition of the Vaisesika philosophy. The later works on the Vaisesika combine with the Nyaya. The Nyaya and the Vaisesika are allied systems of philosophy (*samanatantra*). They have the same end in view, namely, liberation of the individual self.

There is, however, some difference between the two systems on two fundamental points. While the Nyaya accepts four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony. The Vaisesika recognizes only two—perception and inference, and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to perception and inference.

Secondly, the Naiyayikas give us a list of sixteen padarthas which, according to them, cover the whole of reality and include those accepted in the other system. The Vaisesikas, on the other hand, recognize only seven padarthas and comprehend all reals under them. Padartha literally means the object denoted by a word. So by padartha we propose to mean all objects of knowledge or all reals.

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There are six kinds of being or positive realities, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence. To these the later Vaisesikas added a seven padartha called abhava which stands for all negative facts.

The *Nyaya-Padarthadharmasamgraha* starts with the universe which is an endless cycle of existence. The existence can also include other sorts of motions like the motion which is microscopic and the inter-atomic vibrations leading up to macroscopic motions like that of planets and stars. This motion will stop only in the period when the universe starts the next cycle and thus, in this time, the atomic laws collapse. Here, the universe will be guided with the will of a personified God along with the laws of nature, which are seen as abstract. Thus, the knowledge of the universe, and its creation, dissolution and life can be comprehended by the consciousness that can be said to be an active element when it comes to the actions of the universe.

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### 2.1 UNIT OBJECTIVES

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After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Describe the *uddesa* of the six *padarthas*
- Discuss the concepts of *samavaya*, *samanya* and *vishesha*

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### 2.2 ASTIKA AND NASTIKA SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

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Hindu philosophy has been divided into six *astika* schools of thoughts also known as *darsanam*; which means 'view'. These accept the Vedas as the main revealed scriptures. The three *nastika* 'heterodox' schools on the other hand do not see the Vedas as the sole primary authoritative text. They have stressed on the traditions of thought.

The *astika* schools are as follows:

- *Samkhya*, which is an atheistic and dualist theoretical exposition of the consciousness and related matter.
- Yoga can be said to be the school which stresses on contemplation, meditation and liberation.
- *Nyaya* which comes closest to logic stresses on sources of knowledge which are called the *Nyaya Sutras*.
- Also the *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, an empiricist school which stresses on atomism.
- *Mimamsa*, an anti-ascetic and also an anti-mysticism school, stresses on orthopraxy.
- Vedanta, which is the final parameter of knowledge according to the Vedas, can be called the 'Jnan' (or the knowledge) 'Kanda' (part). It is a dominant current of Hinduism as seen in the post-medieval period.

The *nastika* schools have been classified as follows:

- Jainism
- Carvaka
- Buddhism

During the Gupta period which is known as the ‘Golden Age’ of Hinduism, the distinction of six orthodox schools was prevalent but with the disappearance of Vaisesika and Mimasa, they became obsolete when the sub-schools of Vedanta like *dvaita* and *advaita* began to rise to prominence. Nyaya survived in the 17th century and came to be known as ‘Navya Nyaya’ which means the ‘Neo- Nyaya ’; and the *Samkhya* lost its status as an independent school, with its tenets adopted by Yoga and Vedanta.

The *dvaita vedanta* (which talks of dualistic conclusions of the Vedas) school of philosophy had been founded by Madhvacharya. It talks of dualism by explaining the existence of two separate realities. Here, the first would be Vishnu or Brahma. Vishnu by himself, is the supreme self; he is an independent reality and holds the key to the truth of the universe. The next reality would be the dependent one, but the real universe is present in its separate essence. According to the *advaita vedanta*, God has a personal role and is the real eternal entity controlling the universe. Five distinctions have been made which include Vishnu distinct from soul and Vishnu distinct from matter. Souls are very different from matter. One soul is different from another. Souls are eternal and are seen as dependent on the will of Vishnu. Theology addresses the problem of evil and the idea that souls have not been created. There is a belief in the existence of individuals which is grounded in the divine– with depictions including images, reflections or shadows of the divine but not identical to the divine. Also, salvation can be described as a realization of a finite reality which is dependent on the supreme self.

It can be said that all systems evolve with time and the philosophy of *padarthadharmasamgraha* will not be an exception to this rule.

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### 2.3 PRASASTAPADACARYA: PADARTHADHARMASAMGRAHA

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After giving due credit to God and Kanada, Prasastapada lists six categories in Vaisesika sutras. One has to understand their similarities and differences. He said that understanding will stem from the merit which comes from the jurisdiction of God.

The categories specified consist of nine substances, seventeen qualities and five motions. The word ‘Ca’ which appears at the end of the qualities listed in the sutras specifies that seven additional qualities are to be added in the list. When one discusses motion, then the fifth sort ‘Going’ (*gamana*) includes all the motions other than expanding, contracting, upward and downward movements individually.

Prasastapada has defined both the universal as well as the community aspects. It can thus be said that the ‘universal’, as per Prasastapada, could be the basis on

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which the community of nature can be apprehended in numerically different things. The definition of 'universal' is not precise. Ether, time and space, also are said to have 'lower universals'. Thus, the technical names, namely, 'ether', 'time' and 'space,' could be given to them.

## NOTES

Prasastapada explains that ether-ness, time-ness and space-ness could be seen to be having a singular locus and will not exist in more than one locus. Thus, they cannot be said to have 'lower universals' in comparison to substance-ness.

Thus, the name 'ether,' given through the stream of beginning-less time, cannot be applied to anything else. This is characteristic to the name 'ether' because it is uncommon to others. This is a qualifier by implication. Thus, ether is differentiated from others because it is the referent of the word 'ether' which has been handed down to us through the stream of beginning-less time.

Prasastapada, unlike Candramati, adopted a criterion different from that of the Vaisesikas. It may be that Prasastapada followed such a way because he flourished after a great philosophical grammarian, Bhartrihari, and that Candramati was satisfied with his own explanation because he flourished before Bhartrihari. The post-Prasastapadas, Vaisesikas and Niyayikas developed their own way of explaining linguistic problems. Their explanations, though based on Prasastapada, appeared to be quite different from it. Time as a causal agent is interpreted by Prasastapada in all its pervasive nature. Time has a similar reference in other texts. It alone creates innumerable universes and in a very short time destroys everything. Its essential nature is hidden. Time is established in the absolute being or in the cosmic energy. Even though time creates an endless universe, it remains a constant. Time destroys everything but yet time itself is indestructible. Prasastapada incorporated seven more *gunas* from the last word '*cha*' in this sutra.

These are as follows:

- Shabda
- Dharma
- Adharma
- Gurutva
- Dravatva
- Sneha
- Samskara

Two primary philosophers, Kanada and Prasastapada will be of interest to us as contributions of both are remarkably significant.

Prasastapada has in his great work spoken about Kanada's Sutras and *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, which makes him the co-founder of the Vaisesika system. He has also made many advances in the Nyaya Logic. It can be seen that the fusion of these two schools had started early and could be said to be complete with the *Nyaya-Vartika* been written. This also shows the tendency to synthesise. One could speak of the title syncretism to the work of two major systems namely Nyaya and Vaisesika through a symmetrical representation.

These works have been written from the time of Udayana and are present even today. One could quote the work on destruction of action which comes from the destruction which could be because of the intimate cause and the non-intimate cause and through their subsequent conjunction. Also, one could see an antecedent non-existence which could be destroyed with the same cause which brings in this counter-entity. It can be seen that the reciprocal non-existence could be destroyed with the causes of counter-entity.

This account of destruction and that of creation was explained by Prasastapada in the book, *Padarthadharmasamgraha*. The modern *Naiyayikas* can lessen the account of destruction to uniformity by concluding that there is only one cause of all destruction which could be dissolution of the union that is the non-intimate cause which brings about the product.

Kanada, who was known as one of the early philosophers of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, has talked about the atomic view. He has been using the term ‘*Vishesha*’ which is the particularity in an atom and also seen as the sense of ‘*Antya Vishesha*’ which will mean the ‘final individual’; which is the ultimate individuality when it comes to each atom that individuates itself from the rest. The same could be said to be a unique feature when it comes to the school and thus one can coin the term ‘*vishesha*’ which is an adjective form of ‘*Padarthadharmasamgraha*’—the name of this school.

Prasastapada, who had come many centuries after Kanada, also talks of the dissolution of earth, air, water and fire when it comes to the atomic constituents which exclude space as the nature of the same is seen as non-atomic. Here, the conjoining and disjoining of the atoms can be seen as a natural property when it comes to atoms, but Prasastapada has given a higher will and a higher order when it comes to the guiding principle of the universal dissolution which comes over the natural karma.

The cosmological cycle in case of creation and dissolution when it comes to an atomic level, is a breakdown of the natural properties of atoms like the time for dissolution, till the final process of creation would be restarted, and in case the natural properties hold good again, it would be a remarkable insight.

Initially, it can be said that atoms could be described to conjoin and disjoin which could bring in creation and dissolution among the new substances which is due to the karma (laws).

Here, one notes that Prasastapada stressed on the empirical inference which redefines observational inference. The same has two levels which are *drishta*, that is, the observed, and *samanya* which is generally observed.

Prasastapada talks of the ‘self’ which will contact the mind before one can draw a final conclusion. There is a clear parallel which is present among the given method of comparing the unknown object with the partly observed object which here is in recollection to the idea of the ‘self’ contacting the mind as is evident in the final step of inference. Self could be said to be known and observed as it would mean to be present in the physical sense which is to contact the mind whose existence will be seen by the memory of previous interactions. Here, the external process of

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observation could be mirrored in the internal process, as that of understanding. Thus, the entire section could be dedicated to the establishment of the concept that could be expressed as 'I'.

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Such an example is *Samanyato drishta* which means 'The Generally Observed'. It can be seen that the name suggests substances which can be observed like air, which cannot be seen but can be inferred through known properties.

This is because air possesses touch. Touch will have the attributes of motion and quality. Also the substance will not take in any other given substance.

Thus, it can be said that the principle of empirical inference can be seen as a cause-effect relation in any of the given derivatives. This process of inference can happen in any of the following ways:

- An object is present and is ? to the object of inference that exists.
- An object is present and is ? to the object of inference which does not exist.
- An object which does not exist ? to the object of inference which does not exist.

This inference can be drawn from both the existence and non-existence of the given premise.

The Vaisesika School does not give any importance to the Upamana-analogy and Shabda-verbal testimony which was earlier seen as a method of acquiring knowledge through the Nyaya School.

The Vaisesika sutra talks of the atoms and of the existent and that which would have no cause (which means that an atom could be eternal). The same will not be perceived but could be inferred from the effect of the same.

Atoms can be said to be the primordial infinitesimal particles which constituted everything except space. Thus, terms like atom and space, show the picture of current-day atom and also that of space, but with a few differences.

Atoms in Vaisesikas were of four kinds: Earth, Apa (Water), Tejas (Fire) and Vayu (Air). The given atoms could be seen to be the characteristic mass, with the basic molecular structure which includes the dyad, triad etc.; the fluidity, viscosity, velocity (and the quantity of impressed motion which is the Vega) and the characteristic potential colour, or the taste, smell or touch which one cannot get with a chemical operation. When one looks at these four kinds of atoms, the same will be involved among the chemical reactions when the space remains unaffected.

### Atomic Combinations

Atoms could be said to conjoin or disjoin when a reaction happens. Conjunction and disjunction as Kanada says, can be of many types. The three kinds of conjunction are as follows:

- Contact which one could get because of the motion of one object and when the same does not happen to the other.
- When both objects are in motion.
- Contact which can happen with actual contact.



Prasastapada has explained the same by referring to an example where he talks of a dyad of earth that could be in contact with two water atoms that are themselves in contact and thus, make up a water dyad. The earth dyad's contact with the water dyad could be produced by the contact that happens with the water atoms. The same could be crucial when one comes to a ubiquitous substance such as *akasha* which may contact a non-ubiquitous substance, or it could also be that two ubiquitous substances might not be in contact as they do not have the motion. Disjunction is also seen by the older Vaisesikas as a quality that inheres in a pair of substances in case one has just parted contact with the other substance.

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### Nature of Atomic Combinations

Atoms are invisible, although the final substance which gets made with the conjunction of many atoms would be visible. Here, one can list many causes that could facilitate multi-conjunction. The atoms conjoin in pairs and keep unifying till the visible substance is made. When there is no external agent like heat that can be applied, then the properties of the atom could be reflected as is in the binary structure too. The atoms now join and are driven by an inherent tendency that is the natural propensity to form dyads. Prasastapada has popularized the scene of dyads while Kanada's system has taken a different stand.

Kanada also talks of atoms which conjoin due to their inherent tendency. At the same time, the different atoms will combine in different patterns. This combination could be in pairs, triads, tetrads etc.

These atoms combine  $\equiv$  basic unit/molecule with two, three or  $n$  number of units and not two, three or  $n$  number of dyads in which  $n \geq 2$

At the same time, the basic unit of  $n$  atoms  $\equiv$  1 atom + 1 atom...  $n$  atoms where  $n \geq 1$ .

This would mean that a group of  $n$  atoms will combine together to make a unit. ( $n \geq 1$ )

Prasastapada also explains that atoms combine  $\equiv$  only to a binary molecule and not a triad, tetrad etc.

Also, the basic unit of  $n$  dyads  $\equiv$  1 dyad + 1 dyad...  $n$  dyads where  $n \geq 1$

It can be said that the dyad combinations would also combine in different proportions so that they could form isomeric substances. Thus, it can be said that the inherent properties which are seen by different substances could be because of the collocation process in which the mean quantitative difference along with the spatial arrangement that is only '*paramanu*' and could be translated as 'atom' which stands at a point of energy which has zero mass and dimension. Therefore, the dyad is a finite mass and size and spatial arrangement could become an important qualifier when it comes to the properties of the final substance which is to be formed.

The same could be comparable to the current physics point-of-view which is concerned with the basic particles like electrons, protons and bosons that are called 'energy clouds'. They could combine in many combinations and make many kinds of known matter. Thus, the properties of energy if seen in a basic unit, is constant, but there is still a difference which is seen in the combination of quantity and quality.

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It can be said that the basic unit is formed, and the same can go through conjunction because of many causes apart from the basic impulse and the nature of the atom. Thus, the atom could be different from the given substance.

Prasastapada and Kanada take into account the idea of the process of combination when it comes to the basic unit which could be formed by a variety of substances that follow the laws of the Universe. Also, the element of consciousness could be seen to play a vital role in what the world is today.

Another condition could be atomic reactions. Here, the substance may change qualitatively with the effect of heat.

Vaisesikas explains that when heat is applied to substances, they could break down to the most basic entity (which is the '*paramanu*') and then get transformed into a new substance. The Nyaya School will not believe in decomposition to the basic entity. Thus, the Vaisesikas explain the transformation of a substance by way of changes in the basic properties of atoms and the Nyaya disagrees.

Prasastapada has given a specific example. He considers the fertilized ovum, as an application of animal heat combined with bio-motor energy.

It is a phenomenon which is seen in the fertilized ovum which breaks down to its constituents which further gets reduced to homogenous earth atoms. The homogenous are of the same '*bhuta*'. Thus, the basic atoms of the *bhuta* earth recombine under the influence of metabolic heat which makes them germ-plasma. The germ-plasma then forms an enriching self with the help of body nutrients.

It is evident at every stage that heat breaks down germ-plasma and forms constituent atoms that combine with the constituent atoms of food, along with all the base atoms, and make the resultant cells and tissues. Here, heat would be the crucial element.

We could also talk about the *hetero-bhautic* compounds in action. Here one can note that the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas agree on the different *bhutas* of atoms which include atoms of earth, air, water and fire which when they come in contact under the stress of heat make the resultant formations. Heat alone would thus not be sufficient and thus one needs a medium so that the reaction keeps going. *Hetero-bhautic* has been studied with respect to reactions among the atoms of different *bhutas*.

Thus, the medium would be the energizer in case of atoms which have different *bhutas* and brings up the intra-atomic dynamic forces that form new substances as the end-product of the reaction. One can explain the same on the basis of the following analogy. Tea leaves and sugar will not be chewed together to get the effect of tea. It can be that the two be boiled in water in which water is the substratum, and this boiled decoction be drunk with or without milk and consumed as tea. Theoretically, this will be similar to the tea leaves and sugar which could be chewed together.

Thus, some of the *hetero-bhautic* atoms need a substratum which can inter-bond them, although this substratum could remain unaltered at the end. Milk thus can be seen to be the quasi-compound in which water could be the energizer which

is present for the earth particles and in case water is extracted from milk, then the milk will still have the milky substance in it. Also, the four *bhautic* atoms could be the substratum, and thus could be said to be the only earth atoms that can correspond to basic changes which are seen in the atoms as they can arrest the molecular motion which includes the motion of liquid flowing because of gravity. On the other hand, the earth atoms that could counteract the tendency of atoms fall in this peculiar group.

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### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. What happens when heat is applied to substances?
2. What are the three components of the nastika school of thought?
3. State an example of a quasi-compound.

## 2.4 UDDESA OF SIX PADARTHAS AND PARIKSHA

Prasastapada made a clear distinction among enumeration (*Uddesa*) and definition and analysis (*Laksana* and *Pariksa*). For Prasastapada, the '*padartha*' are the most comprehensive parts of the enumeration. It is thus a divisor of reality, analysing the same. It portrays a correlation of thought and speech. These are not said to be the basic structure or projections of speech or thought. It has been said that '*astitva*' which is 'ness' portrays the factuality. *Jneyatva* is the 'know-how', *abhidheyatva* is the 'nameability' of the dominator of the six *padarthas*.

This category is highly related to the *Uddesa* which is the enunciation or the listing. It is one of the first steps in Prasastapada's two fold procedure. They do not talk of definition, analysis and abstraction. These categories do not talk of nation species but are still real and practical. Prasastapada talks of the universals as the genuine enumerables or object(s) of enunciation. They could be nameable identities which are the objective component of the world, real subjects of the predicate and locus of attributes. But the enumeration stops at this. The attributes of predicates of the universe can be recognised as nameable entities. These can then be a result of the *laksana* and *pariksa* abstractions. Prasastapada does not talk of the sequence or order of the categories or procedures by which one can classify the same.

### Padarthadharmsamgraha

One could describe the nature of things which brings in good results. The highest result is the absolute cessation of pain. A knowledge of the true nature of the six categories—substance, quality, action, generality, individuality and inherence through their similarities and dissimilarities, is the means of accomplishing the highest bliss. *Abhava*, negation, is not mentioned separately, simply because it is dependent (for its conception) upon *bhava* (the six categories enumerated), and not because there is no such category. This knowledge proceeds from *dharma* (moral law) manifested by the injunctions of the Lord. Among these, the substances are earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self (or soul) and mind. These, mentioned in the sutra (aphorism

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of Kanada) by their general as well as specific names, are nine only; as besides these, none other is mentioned by name. The qualities are: colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort; these are the seventeen that are directly mentioned in the sutra. The word 'ca' (and), however; indicates the other seven: viz., gravity, fluidity, viscosity, faculty (speed) (samskara), the two-fold invisible force *dharma* and *adharma*, virtue and vice, and sound. These make up the twenty-four qualities. Throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going, these are the only five actions and all other actions as gyrating, evacuating, quivering, flowing upwards, transverse falling, falling downwards, rising and the like, being only particular forms of going, and not forming distinct classes by themselves. Of generality, or community (universality), there are two kinds, the higher and the lower; and it serves as the basis of inclusive or comprehensive cognition. The higher (or highest) generality is that of 'being'; as it is this that extends over the largest number of things; and also because it is this alone that is a generality pure and simple, always serving, as it does, as the basis of comprehensive cognitions. The lower generalities are 'substance' and the rest (quality, action, generality, individuality and inherence) extend over a limited number of things. These latter, being the basis of inclusive as well as exclusive cognitions, are sometimes regarded as individualities also. Unique particularities reside in the ultimate substances. They are the factors that make for the ultimate distinctions among these substances. Inherence (*samavaya*: intimate union, coming together inseparably) is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained, such a relationship being the basis of the idea that 'this is in that'.

In his *Nyayakandali*, a famous commentary on the *Padarthadarmasamgha* of *Prasastapada*, Sridhara (flourished circa 1000 AD) gives a fairly detailed defence of a proof for the existence of God from the nature of 'being an effect'. The basic idea of this proof is that all composite substances, such as 'gross earth' must have been produced by an intelligent agent. The Vaisesika school which Sridhara was a member of, believed that middle-sized material substances, such as jars, trees, the Earth itself, etc., are composed out of smaller substances and, eventually, out of partless atoms. The atoms, being simple, are eternal, according to the Vaisesikas, as are souls, space, and time. But non-simple substances, such as jars, trees, etc., cannot be eternal, and so must have come to be. All composites whose cause we know of (e.g. jars, chariots, palaces, watches), however, were produced by an intelligent agent; so it stands to reason that trees, the bodies of humans, the Earth, and so on, were also produced by some intelligent agent. That agent, Sridhara argues, must be omniscient and omnipotent, and there is no need to posit the existence of more than one such agent. Thus the agent who created trees, the bodies of humans, the earth, etc., is God.

Vaisesika is one of the six Hindu schools of philosophy in India. It has been seen that the same has been closely associated to the Hindu school of logic, which is the Nyaya School.

*Padarthadarmasamgraha* starts from atomism and then goes to the objects in the physical universe which are reducible to a said number of atoms. It has been

seen that the Padarthadharmasamgraha system was separate from the Nyaya, and then the two merged as they were related to metaphysical theories. Thus, in the classical form, it can be said that the Vaisesika school was different from the Nyaya in many crucial aspects. Like, where Nyaya takes into account four sources of knowledge, the Vaisesika only talks of perception and inference. Also in Kanada's original philosophies, Vaisesika's atomism is also different from the atomic theory of modern science. The same claims the functioning of atoms (with characterization and functioning in their way) which has been directed by the will of the supreme being or what we know as the supreme concept.

The Nyaya of Vaisesika Sutras does not give any detail of theistic systems. Thus the Vaisesika Sutras' lines '*Tad vacanad amnayasya pramanyam*', does not refer to god. Also, the Nyaya Sutras make a little explanation or reference to God and, at the same time, *Prasastapada* has mentioned god in the opening lines of the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* but not in much detail. Although, he has spoken about creation and destruction but God has not been given a prominent position in the system. It can be said that the synthesis is not satisfactory as the twelve objects of knowledge and the Vaisesika categories do overlap with each other.

Thus, it can be said that the division of *padarthas* to the *bhava* and *abhava*, which has been made by Udayana, shows the earlier stage in the transition. For the same, one could look at the six *padarthas* of *Prasastapada* and find the seventh with *Sivaditya*. One can look at the number of Vaisesika *padarthas* increasing after *Prasastapada*, whose work was made in the 5th century AD.

Udayana has in his work *Kiranavalli* given a commentary of *Prasastapada*'s work, and also spoken of the six *padarthas*. Udayana also speaks only about the *abhava* in comparison to the other six, with the denial of the *bhava padarthas*.

The ontology could be said to be an account of fundamentally distinct things. Thus, it answers the question in philosophy of: 'What is there?'

This category could be known as the *padartha* which includes whatever is knowable or could be given a name.

One of the elements, the substance (*dravya*) possesses motion and quality, and can bring in a combinative cause like the marks of substance as per *Padarthadharmasamgraha*. Also a substance is not said to be the locus in the constant absence of quality as per Udayana of *Laksanavali*.

Another element is the quality (*guna*) which could be inhering in a substance, and might not have the quality, and might also not be the proximate cause of the given conjunctions and disjunctions – like the marks of quality as per the Kanada of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*.

At the same time, motion (*karma*) would be residing in one substance and might not have the quality, as it could be the proximate cause in case of the conjunctions and disjunctions, like the marks of motion as per Kanada of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*.

Also, one can mention the universal (*samanya*) which pervades in all objects; and could be seen in a similar form in many individuals. It also generates the idea of

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its form in one or more things and could be said to be the basis of the inclusion, as is present in all the substrates as per Prasastapada of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*.

Inherence (*samavaya*) could be said to be the relationship which is present among the things which are inseparable, and stand with one another as in the container. This could be a relationship which could form the basis of the idea of 'this is in that' as per Prasastapada of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*.

Ultimate individuator (*visesa*) could be said to be the ultimate individuates which are present in the eternal substances. These could be said to be the factors which bring in ultimate distinctions in the given substances as per Prasastapada of *Padarthadharmasamgraha*.

Absence (*abhava*) can be said to be the absence in the object and a notion expressed with the negative particle as per the Udayana of *Laksanavali*.

At the same time in *Laksanavali*, Udayana has explained that one could define many *Padarthadharmasamgraha* categories with the help of the parameter of whether or not they inhere in anything, or are inhered by anything, and in how many things they inhere and how many things inhere in them.

Thus, as per philosophy principles, things could be present in six kinds, namely substance, quality, motion, universal, ultimate individuator and inherence.

Among the above mentioned, the impermanent substance, quality, action, universal, and ultimate individuator inhere in things. At the same time, the permanent substance, inherence, and absence will not have the power of inhering in given things. Also, the substance, quality, and motion would have things inhering in them. It could be said that the universal, ultimate individuator, inherence, and absence will have nothing inhering in them.

Quality possesses the universal that inheres the conjunction and non-conjunction, and at the same time, cannot inhere in the non-inherent cause, in the given sort of conjunction that does not come from conjunction.

Motion is that which possesses the universal and also inheres in the non-inherent cause of conjunction. But it does not inhere in conjunction.

Universal is one which inheres in things, and will have the same loci as is in the mutual absence in all the substrata, and will have nothing inhering in itself.

### 2.4.1 Types of Quality

Quality could be divided into twenty-four sorts that is colour, taste, smell, touch, number, measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, sound, knowledge, happiness, pain, desire, hatred, effort, virtue vice and the inertia.

It is true that some qualities can be accidental, and some are essential, meaning that they are special. It can also be said that some qualities have been seen among all the substances, but others can be seen in some substances only.

At the same time, some of the qualities can be said to be monadic, and at the same time some qualities could be said to be non-monadic meaning that they are inhering in more than one substances.

Similarly, a few qualities are locus pervading, and at the same time some qualities are not.

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### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

4. What is absence according to the Udayana of Laksanavali?
5. What are the different types of quality?

### 2.4.2 Types of Motion

One can classify different types of motions as throwing upwards, throwing downwards, expansion, contraction and other motions which are found in a straight line. Among these, the throwing upwards can be said to be in motion and brings in disjunction at the lower portion, and conjunction which is found in the higher portion. Similarly, throwing downwards can be said to be a motion which brings in conjunction found in the lower portion and, at the same time, disjunction which is found in the higher portion.

Contraction could be explained as a motion which brings in conjunction in the middle portion and brings in disjunction at the peripheries. Expansion can be said to be an action which brings in conjunction at the peripheries and disjunction in the middle parts.

*Table 2.1 Pancha Mahabhutas*

	Prithvi	Jala	Tejas	Vayu	Akasha
Property	Tamo bahula	Satwa Tamo bahula	Satwa bahula	Rajo bahula	Satwa bahula
Utpatti	From Jala	From Tejas	From Vayu	From Akasha	From Atma
Classification	1. Nitya 2. Anitya ( Sharira Sanjnaka, Indriya Sanjnaka, Vishaya Sanjnaka)				
Sharira Sanjnaka	1. Yonija 2. Ayonija)	Ayonija	Present in Aditya Loka	Prana, Vyana, Apana, Udana, Samana	
Indriya Sanjnaka	Ghranendriya	Rasanendriya	Chakshurendriya	Sparshanendriya	Shrotrendriya
Vishaya Sanjnaka		1. Amba 2. Mareecha 3. Mara 4. Apa	1. Bhouma 2. Divya 3. Udarya 4. Akaraja		All types of Shabda
Gunas	14	14	11	9	6
Samanya Gunas	Sankhya, Prithakatwa, Vibhaga, Samyoga, Paratwa, Parinama, Aparatwa, Samskar, Dravatwa, Gurutwa	Sankhya, Prithakatwa, Parinama, Samyoga, Paratwa, Vibhaga, Samskar, Aparatwa, Dravatwa, Gurutwa	Sankhya, Prithakatwa, Parinama, Samyoga, Paratwa, Vibhaga, Aparatwa, Samskar, Dravatwa	Sankhya, Prithakatwa, Parinama, Samyoga, Paratwa, Vibhaga, Aparatwa, Samskar	Sankhya, Vibhaga, Prithakatwa, Parinama, Samyoga,

*Contd...*

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Vishesha Guna	Gandha, Rasa, Roopa, Sparsha	Roopa, Sparsha, Rasa, Snehatwa	Roopa, Sparsha	Sparsha	Shabda
Swaroopa	Varna: Many colours Rasa: All 6 Rasas Gandha: 2 types Sparsha: Anushna Sheeta	Varna: Shukla Rasa: madhura Sparsha: Sheetala Dravatva: Sansiddika	Varna: Shukla Sparsha: Ushana Dravatva: Naimittika		
Bhava	Gandha, Ghranendriya, Gourava, Sthairya, Murtitva	Sneha, Kleda, Mardava	Roopa, Darshana, Prakasha, Paka, Ushnata	Sparsha, Rookshata, Sparshanendriya, Dhatu sancharana, Indriya prerana	Shabda, Laghu, Sookshma, Srotrendriya, Viveka

*Samanya* and *Vishesha* have been the *Shad Padartha* which are the principles of Ayurveda Nidana. With these principles, the management of the same is designed. *Samanya* could be said to be the major cause for *Vruddhi* and *Visheshata* which brings in *Kshaya*. This *Vruddhi* can be achieved with the *Samanya Dravya*, *Guna* and *Karma*. Thus, the nourishment of *dhatu* can be caused, with the drugs which have *Samanya Dravya*, *Samanya Guna* and *Samanya Karma*. Hence, these *padarthas* are the major benchmarks of knowledge in the practical utility of the given science.

It has been seen that the six *padarthas* could be named as the *Samanya*, *Samavaya*, *Vishesha*, *Guna*, *Dravya*, and *Karma*.

It has been seen that similar *bhavas*, in case of *Guna*, *Dravya*, and *Karma*, could bring in an augmentation and also raise dissimilar *bhavas* which could bring in a depletion or decrease.

As per the Padarthadharmsamgraha school, the things that exist, can be recognized and called the *padarthas* (which is the meaning of a word). Here the objects of experience is what it infers to. It has been seen that the objects of experience could get classified in six categories, which includes the *dravya* (substance), *karma* (activity), *guna* (quality), *vishesha* (particularity), *samanya* (generality) and *samavaya* (inherence). It was seen later that the Vaisecikas (which included the *Sridhara*, *Udayana* and *Sivaditya*) took into them another dimension which was the category of *abhava* (which means non-existence). Here, it could be seen that the first three categories which have been defined could be the *artha* (that is perceived) a pointer towards real objective existence. At the same time, the last three categories could be said to be the *budhyapekam* (which is a product of intellectual discrimination), a pointer towards logical categories.

It has been seen in the early Vaisesika epistemology that only looks at *pratyakol* (perception) with the *anumana* (inference) giving us *pramanrs* (that is the way to the valid knowledge). Here, the two means of valid knowledge have also been recognized by the Nyaya school, where the *upamana* (comparison) and *sabda* (which is the verbal testimony) could also be included in the *anumana*. Thus, the syllogism which is similar to the Vaisesika School is also similar to that of Nyaya.



But it may be noted that the names which have been given by Prasastapada in the five members of syllogism could be said to be different.

It has also been noticed in the early Vaisesika texts that the following syllogism which proves that all the objects which include the four *bhutasap* (water), *pwatei* (earth), *tejas* (fire) and *vayu* (air) can belong to the indivisible *paramaGas* (atoms). One could assume that this matter is not constituted of indivisible atoms, and that the same is continuous. For example, when we take a stone, one could divide it into infinite pieces (as this matter is continuous). At the same time, the Himalayas can also be divided infinitely into many pieces, and at the same time one could re-make the Himalayas with these broken infinite numbers of pieces of the first Himalayas. Thus, one can begin with a stone and then talk of the Himalayas, that could be said to be a paradox – so the original assumption which says that the matter is continuous could be said to be wrong, and the objects are made up of finite number of *pramanrs* (which are atoms).

As per the Vaisesika school, it has been explained that the *trasarei* (which are the dust particles seen in the sunbeam coming through a small window hole) could be the smallest *mahat* ( which are the perceivable) particles and the same could be said to be *tryaichs* ( which are triads). These could be made of about three parts, where each of the parts is defined as *dvyadef* ( which is a dyad). Also, the *dvyachs* can be seen to be made of two parts, where every part is said to be the *paramana* (atom). Thus, one could conclude that the *paramanas* (atoms) are generally indivisible and eternal, and thus they cannot be created nor destroyed. Also each *paramana* (atom) has its own distinct *viseit* (which is its individuality).

In later centuries, the school also has similar views as that of Nyaya school of Indian philosophy. This has thus formed a combined school like the *Nyaya-Vaiseihu*. But it met a natural decline in India when it came into the 15th century.

One could conclude that *Padarthadharmasamgraha* talks of the visible universe which is a part of the original stock of atoms (which are called the *janim asatac*). The Brahma Sutra says '*ubhayathapi na karmatas tad-abhavai*'. Thus, as per this sutra, it cannot be said that at the time of creation, atoms will join together as they are impelled by the karmic impulse which is present among the atoms themselves, as the atoms in their primeval state will not have the ethical responsibility before combining into complex objects. This could bring in them a pious and sinful reaction. Therefore, it can be said that the initial combination of atoms is a result of this residual karma in living entities which are dormant before creation.

The same is related to the *Nyaya* system and merges with the formers view of liberation of the self. It has spoken of all the objects of knowledge which have been categorized among the seven categories which are the *Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Vishesha, Samavaya* and *Abhava*. These have been studied in this book as the seven *padarthas*. *Ayurveda* has also classified the *padarthas* under *Karana*. There is but a variance in the sequences which is shown by *Samanya, Vishesha, Guna, Dravya, Karma, and Samavaya*. Here it can be seen that the *Samanya* and *Vishesha* could be emphasized in the clinical aspect. At the same time, the *Nyaya* and *Vaisesika* talk of the realistic theory of the Universe. As per these, the universals

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could be said to be the eternal entities that are seen to be distinct from individuals. Also, the same universal (self) which is present in many individuals of this class have been explained in this theory. The universal could be the basis of the notion of the sameness which one has to talk about when it comes to the individuals of a certain class. Thus, one can see the common essence seen in different individuals which are now brought under a class and can be essentially the same. It can thus be said that the Samanya or which is the universal could be a real entity that relates to a general idea and the class concepts of the mind.

Universal could be distinguished in the *para* and could be said to be the highest and all pervading, at the same time the *apara* could be said to be the lowest and *parapara* would be the intermediate. Thus, practically, in case the properties of the substances improve the same substances then their identical properties and action, could be named as *parasamanya* or *dravyasamanya*. And at the same time, if the properties of the substances improve a particular substance, like its qualities, and do not alter the absolute identity, then the same can be said to be as the *Aparasamanya* or *Gunasamanya*. One could talk of innumerable particularities as the individuals in whom they are present are innumerable. The individuals can be distinguished because of their particularities, and at the same time, the latter could be distinguished by them. Thus, the *Vishesha* could be said to be eternal and distinguishable which is the opposite of the *Samanya*. It has also been seen in the medical practice, that *Samanya* and *Vishesha* could also be applied for the *Tripura*.

Time could be said to be the cause of all the non-eternal things at the same time the parameter of time is irrelevant and absent from among the eternal substances. As is the case in the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* universal, it has been taken as ubiquitous and timeless. The same could be looked at as time and space as not being universal. This process, which looks at the passage of time in an object could also be relative. One could also say that it is universal and the same is true in all time and space and even the being. Time could be differentiated from the parameter of space and space is not separate from eternal things. The same time could be associated with motion, that starts with the universe and there is a cyclic life of creation with dissolution. Here, time could be at rest if the universe is in the process of creation.

It may also be noticed that the early *Padarthadharmasamgraha* looks at existence as the highest genus, that is, not the genus species which lies under a superior genus. Prasastapada names this supreme universal as the *bhava* from the root 'bhu' which means 'to come to be', he also mentions that this *bhava* will include the *dravya*, *guna* and *karma*. Thus, the *bhava* could also be called *satta* then it comes to the time of Prasastapada. The same shows a clear differentiation between the material or real concepts with the intellectual or transcendental ideas that were present at the time of Prasastapada. Here, the inclusion of consciousness and the 'being' as a parameter in the theories of matter or materialistic sciences will not hinder the explanation of matter, rather it will add to a new dimension in this perspective. It can thus be said that the *Nyaya-Padarthadharmasamgraha* will start at the beginning of the universe and will go through an endless cycle. The given existence will be marked with many types of motions – motion which is as microscopic as the inter-atomic vibrations and the motion as macroscopic as that of the planets

and stars. The motion ceases at the rest period if the universe is getting ready for the next cycle. Thus, the atomic laws collapse at this time. The universe can be taken as or guided by the will of God or the laws of nature, which are present at an abstract level. Therefore, it can be said that the knowledge of the universe, and its creation, dissolution and life could be seen in the study of consciousness that is an active element when it comes to the actions of universe.

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6. What are the different types of motion?
7. Name the six padarthas.
8. Distinguish between para and apara.

### 2.4.3 Dravya: The Substance

The *dravya* that has been perceived here is sub-classified into five physical substances which include the *pancha bhutas*, namely, earth, water, air, fire and space. Also, the substance can be defined as the main cause of quality and action. At the same time, Prasastapada looks at the various sub-categories which are related to the substance with the help of the properties like colour, smell, taste, fluidity, touch, viscosity etc., which exist in associations with the *pancha bhutas*.

Fluidity can be both natural and instrumental. Also, water can be said to be in the liquid state naturally and then gets converted to the gaseous state and can also be converted to the solid state through externally applying and removing heat. Thus, it can be said that fluidity could be the primary state of water. At the same time, butter or ghee could be said to be in the solid state (when in winter), but the same would be melted and will come into the liquid state with a small application of heat. Thus, in this case the solid state can be said to be the primary state.

Here the *guna*, *dravya*, and *karma* have also given rise to further categories. These all are non-eternal. The same could be explained with the above mentioned properties. *Dravya* has in it *guna* that is quality and *karma* that is action. For instance, fire that could be what possesses *dravya* and the *guna* of heat is also present along with the action of moving upwards which is seen in the flame. It can thus be said that *guna*, *dravya*, and *karma* could have real objective existence as they are associated to real substances.

*Dravya* in relation to the *gunas* and *paryayas* has been studied as an important element in this text. The *jneya* is also known as the *dravya* which is a substance with *gunas* and with qualities and *paryayas* which means the developments or modifications done to these substances.

Qualities can be said to be inseparable from *dravya* and thus could be seen as the constituting art of the breadth of a *dravya*. Also, the modifications extend over a period of time, and will also have in them the sequence and the length of a *dravya*. Modifications can be done on the substance and its qualities. Modification, here, would be a part of the combination of substances which is the substantial

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modification. The same could be of two kinds: one made with the combination of similar substances and the second, which is made with the combination of unlike substances. It is this combination of atoms and that of the substance which forms the *skandha* like the *dvyanuka tryanuka*.

Modifications of qualities can also be said to be of two kinds: one that is produced, with the increase or decrease of the given qualities of the same substance, and the second which is the result of the combination of qualities in different substances.

Thus, when it comes to the nature of *dravya* or substance one can say that qualities and modifications, could be subject to production along with the destruction with the permanence (which is *Utpada-vinfisa-dhrauvya*).

To be would then be to exist. A substance is seen as something distinct from its qualities and modifications, but the same has to be seen as identical to them, as none of them could exist without the other. When one looks at the old form or modification, like loose earth, is destroyed, there could be a new one, just like a jar is produced. Here it can be seen that in both cases one retains the same substance, which is the earth. Thus, it can be said that production and destruction is happening consequently and in continuance or permanence.

Also, one could be looking at things, which one could call the *Dravyarthikanaya* and *Paryarthikanaya*. Here the production of a jar is the production of something which did not previously exist, when seen from the latter point of view, which means the *Paryaya* or modification. It shows the production of something which was not existing previously and when one has a look at it from the former point of view, which is the *dravya* or the substance. Thus, when one talks of the soul, it becomes, with merits or demerits, a god, a denizen of hell, a man, when one looks at it from the first point of view, thus it can be said that the being is the same. At the same time, when we look at the second concept, it would not be the same, which means that it would be different in each case.

From this, one can come to the celebrated *Saptabhanginaya* which are the seven modes of assertion. Here, one can affirm the existence of a thing which one can see from one point of view (which is the *Syad asti*), and then deny it from another (which means the *Syann Ssti*); and then one can affirm both existence and non-existence through a reference to different times (which is *Syad asti nasti*). Thus, when one thinks of affirming the aspects of existence and non-existence at the same time and has to look from the same point of view, then one has to assert that the thing cannot be so spoken of (which is the *Syad avaktavyah*). Thus, one can say that in some circumstances, there is an affirmation of existence which cannot be made, (*Syad asti avaktavyah*); and also there is a non-existence (*Syan nasti avaktavyah*); and one could also see both (which is *Syad asti nasti avaktavyah*).

Thus, one can say that the seven modes dictate that a thing must not be seen as existing everywhere, in all period of times, in every time and as everything. It may exist in one place and will not be there in another; at the same time these modes do not mean that one cannot judge the certainty of a certain thing and one has to use

the probabilities only. The same is implied in the fact that every assertion that stands true would be true if there are certain conditions of space, time etc. that are fulfilled.

This is substance of the section that looks at the *Dravyasamanya* or *Dravya* generally.

### Species of Dravya

In this section we will discuss *Dravyavisesa*. *Dravya* could be divided into *jiva* and *ajiva*. *Jiva* is *chetana*, which means the sentient or conscious, and *ajiva*, *achetana*, which means the insentient or unconscious. The latter can be of five kinds which includes *pudgala* (matter), *adharmā* (unrighteousness), *dharma* (right conduct), *kala* (time), and *akasa* (space). *Akasa* can be divided into two parts: *loka* and *aloka*. The first would be filled with *jiva* and the first four unconscious substances with the other as void. One could note that some qualities which include *murta*, which is the *indriyagrahya* could be said to be perceptible with the senses. But there are some other qualities like *amūrta* that cannot be perceptible through the senses.

It can also be said that the *jiva* or *atman* would be related to the worldly condition. There exist four kinds of *prana* that are known as the living powers. These are as follows:

- Indriyaprana, which includes sensational power which can be of five kinds
- Balaprana, the power of action of the body, speech, and mind
- Ayuhprana, the power of sustaining the bodily form
- Anapanaprana, the power of respiration

Here it can be said that the first containing five kinds and the second containing three, all together these could be taken as ten.

One can list the four kinds of *prana* which have the effects of *pudgala* along with the *jiva* which has a possibility of developing desire, delusion and hatred and it could be tied to the *karman* that the *pudgala* generates and then to the *pranas*, which will then experience the fruits of the *karman*. The same will then start experiencing and contracting the ties of rest of the *karman*s. Here the *atman* will be sullied by *karman* and one could think that the *pranas* would come in mind again and again till it does not abandon the attachment of the body to external objects.

One can say that there are several forms of god, brutes, man, etc. and that would be similar to the soul and what it goes through and this, in turn, could be similar to the *naman* (name) and *karman* that comes from the *pudgala*. One could mention the body that is the *manas* (mind), along with speech which might be an effect of *pudgala*. It can be said that if one is not made of *pudgala*, and does not have collections of *pudgala* atoms then it is neither a body nor its creator. At the same time, the *karman* comes from *pudgala*, and will be a fetter to the *atman*, as the same will be capable of seeing the properties of *pudgala* and will bring in a desire or hatred for objects which have been created by *pudgala*. Thus, the modification in the soul which takes into consideration hatred, desire and delusion

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could bring in a *bandha* which is a fettered condition. The *atman* could be said to be the author of this condition or development, and not just that of the *pudgala*; here, the actions of the *pudgala* will not be done by *atman* although the same will be related to *pudgala*.

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Here one could assume that *dravya* could be said to be a substratum of qualities which might not be recognized through the *samkhyas* and *veddntins* and thus, the *dravya* and its qualities would be identical. Also, the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* will take two distinct yet related relations of *samavaya* (which is a constant connection). Here, the *jainas* could also admit that the *dravya* can be said to be a substratum of qualities, at the same time the *Samkhyas* and *Veddntins* would be identical, and they cannot exist without each other.

This universe could be said to be made up of six *dravya* or substances which can be classified as follows:

- *Jiva* (which is the living substance): *Jiva* which means the soul is present in reality and would have a separate existence from the body which has it. The same is characterized by *chetana* (which is consciousness) and *upayoga* (which is knowledge and perception). It can be said that the soul experiences both at birth and death, and the same is really not destroyed nor created. Thus, the decay and origin could also be known as disappearing of one state of the given soul and appearing of the other state, which brings the above said modes of the soul.
- *Ajiva* (which are the non-living substances)
- *Pudgala* (matter): Here, matter could get classified as solid, gaseous, liquid, fine materials energy, and the extra-fine matter which are the ultimate particles. *Paramanu* which is also the ultimate particle could be called the basic building block of matter. Qualities of *Paramanu* and *Pudgala* would be the qualities of permanence and indestructibility. The same also look at changes in its modes and yet, the basic qualities remain the same. Thus the same cannot be created or destroyed.
- *Dharma-dravya* (which is the principle of motion)
- *Adharma-dravya* (which is the principle of rest)
- One could talk about the *Dharmastikaya* and *Adharmastikaya* which are seen in the *Jaina* system of thought and talks of the principle of motion and rest. The same pervades the entire universe. Here it could be said that *dharma* and *adharma* will not be motion or rest but will mediate motion and rest as is in other bodies.
- *Akasa* (which is the space): Space could be said to be a substance which accommodates living souls, the principle of motion, matter, principle of rest and time. It is infinite, all-pervading and has infinite space-points.
- *Kala* (time): This could be the real entity as per Jainism and all activities, modifications could be done by the progress of time only.
- *Dravya* (which means the substance): It could be conceived in nine ways. These have been described as, *pravaya* (earth), *tejas* (fire), *ap* (water), *vayu*

(air), *kala* (time), *dik* (space), *atman* (self) *akasa* (ether), and *manas* (mind). Also, one could talk about the five *bhutas*, which can be perceived by the external senses.

#### 2.4.4 Karma or Action

Action or *karma* has fundamental dynamic qualities. The inactive manifestation in the case of this substance is a quality, and the active manifestation is action.

Substances could combine and separate due to action. Action would have no quality. Quality would be dependent upon the substance. Also, the action will not subsist in all the present substances as there would be no change of position. Thus, the basis of action will be the material substances which include earth, air, fire and mind.

*Karma*, which is also called motion, could be seen as a deeper concept in contrast to the physical displacement as related to time.

Prasastapada talks of five kinds of motions. These could be said to be the *Utksepana* which is ejection, *Avaksepana* which is attraction, *Akunchana* which is contraction, *Prasaranawhchih* which is expansion and *Gamanathat* which is composite movement. At the same time, it can be seen that *Vyomashiva* is a motion which is not instantaneous and in fact, is incremental. The same is the case in the processes which include cooking the food in which the food is not cooked instantaneously and the change that will occur in its state happens with a minimum expenditure of energy.

Thus, threshold energy could be seen to be greater than the rest of the energy as seen in the final product which will be obtained when put in comparison to the particle as is seen in the concept of current physics. At the same time it can be seen that the incremental nature of change seen among the substances, as has been shown by *Vyomashiva*, is also seen in today's relativistic physics in which it is said that no action is instantaneous.

As per *karma*, the main existence of an individual, could be the effect of its past; and the same will also impact his future and his present existence. The same has been seen in relation to the explanations of suffering when it comes to the understanding of the theory of dependent origination. The law of *karma* would be a special form and at the same time, the general law of causation which has been formed by *Buddha*.

Distinctions with the concept of karma are as follows:

- *Utksepana* or what could be named as 'throwing upwards'. Thus, because of the action, that conjunction could take place with a higher plane.
- *Avakespana* or what is called 'throwing downwards' where the action would bring in the conjunction at the lower plane.
- *Akunchana* or what is called 'contraction', that will be the activity designed for creating a conjunction in a proximate sphere like twisting of the hand.
- *Prasarana* which is also called 'expansion'.
- *Gamana* which is also called 'locomotion'.

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Also, actions which do not include the first four will be comprehended under locomotion. At the same time, the activity of substances like earth, water, fire, etc. would be perceptible but the activity of entities like the mind are out of the sphere of perception.

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**Karma (activity):** Here it can be said that the *karmas* (activities) which include the 'gu' as qualities will have no separate existence and belong to the category of substances. At the same time, quality could be said to be a permanent feature and is also a transient activity. Here, *akasa* (ether), *dik* (space), *atman* (self), *kala* (time); though substances, could be present without *karma* (activity).

**Samanya (generality):** Here when one looks at the plurality of substances, one could see the relations among them. When the property is found in many substances, it could be named as called *samanya*. Generality could be said to be that category by virtue of which many different individual beings could be enumerated in one class. This would be called by a common name.

Beings are called with the help of a word or term which shows their class like man, cow, etc. These could also have some of the general or common qualities which could be seen in the entire class.

Here the consideration would be the general quality, and many Indian philosophers would look at the following three opinions:

- **Nominalism:** As per this school of thought, generality would not be an essential quality but the name which is given to a similarity among the beings that belong to a class and which distinguishes them from other classes. Thus, the general has no individual or separate existence. Buddhist philosophy has accepted this view.
- **Conceptualism:** Here the second view takes into account that generality is conceptualism. As per this view, the general quality will have no existence except for the individual and the same will not come from outside and enter into an individual.

The individual in general cannot be separated from the other. Thus, the same is a crucial quality or the eternal form when seen in the general individuals who can be apprehended by the mind or intellect. Jaina and Advaita Vedanta system of the Indian philosophy showcase this.

- **Realism:** According to this theory, the general is not a mental thought and the concept is not merely a name but will have its own individual existence. Here, the generals could be said to be eternal categories that are separate from the individual, but do pervade them.

Thus, the general could be included and be a part of the individuals. This could also be the general which could have a similarity among many individuals. Thus, it affects the substance, quality and action. The same is due to the general which had been called by the same name and also belongs to the same class. The given view could be propounded by the *Nyaya-Padarthadharmasamgraha* which is one of the systems of Indian philosophy.



## Distinctions of Generality

When one talks about pervasion, then generality could be of three kinds – *apara*, *para* and *parapara*. *Para* could be said to be most comprehensive, like existence. *Apara* could be the least comprehensive. The third distinction would be the *parapara* which is in between *para* and *apara* and which can be seen as an example of fluidity. Thus, when it comes to existence it is *apara* that has a relation to *para*.

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### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

9. Define *akasa* (space).
10. What are the four kinds of *prana*?
11. *Dravya* is sub-classified into five substances. Name them.

## 2.5 SAMANYA, VISHESHA AND SAMAVAYA

The next three categories of Indian philosophy include *samanya*, *vishesha* and *samavaya*. Thus, it can be said that *samanya* is the class concept while *vishesha* is particularity.

Prasastapada's view of the *samanya* and *vishesha* can be said to be different from that of the later philosophers. One can see that understanding two terms: 'genus' and 'species' can be Prasastapada's intent. Prasastapada also explains *samanya* as *vishesha* in cases which does not include the 'being'.

The concept of 'universal' can be said to be real, independent, ubiquitous that inheres in individual substances, qualities and motions which are repeatable; which could inhere in several distinct individuals at different times and places. One can explain the general term which can be used for an entity is *samanya*. Thus, the postulation of universals as seen in the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* explains the presence of natural kinds, and also explains the fact that certain entities which are same due to their true similarity and not just due to what we think. There is a special feature of this school that could be an inherence which talks of a special feature in case of an individual atom and element. Here Prasastapada explains inherence as the 'here' in a locus and also related to the function of causality.

Also, he conceives that one inherence is present as one can see no indication which is different, and inferences related to different pairs of things which are similar to inherence.

*Samanya*, *samavaya* and *vishesha* are the products of intellectual discrimination. Thus, the idea could be emphasized by Prasastapada which include the *dravya*, *guna* and *karma* with the *bhava* being the 'being'.

Time could also be said to be the cause of all non-eternal things. At the same time, it can be seen that time is irrelevant and thus is absent for eternal substances. Also as per the *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, one can see the universal as ubiquitous and timeless. Here one could define the same with respect to time and space and the same cannot be universal.

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Time can be clearly differentiated from space and space is not absent from eternal things. Time can be related to motion, that starts with the universe and is a cyclic life of creation and dissolution. Here, it can be said that time is at rest when the universe will be in the process of creation. An analogy of this would be working with a piece of clay with many combinations and figures that are present in it and arrangements which are made with it, patterns that can be thought of as pre-existent in the clay.

*Samavaya* (inherence): *Samavaya* is the relation between cause and the effect. Also, one can see the contribution of Prasastapada who has explained this relationship present among the substances which are inseparable, and have been standing with one another as container and the contained. Thus, the relation of *samavaya* has not been perceivable but the same could be inferable when one looks from the inseparable connection as that of the substances.

**Vishesha (Particularity)**

*Vishesha* can mean the perceived substances which are different from one another. It is of two kinds: *Paryaya* and *Vyatireka*. *Paryayas* are modifications in sequence in a single substance like the elements of joy and grief in oneself. *Vyatirekas* are different modifications in different objects such as a cow and a buffalo.

**Abhava**

*Abhava* would mean non-existence, nothing, negation or absence. The same is the negative of *bhava* that relates to the making of being, existing, becoming, or appearance. Here, at the same time *uddayana* will divide the *padartha* (categories) into the *bhava* (existence) that could be said to be real, and *abhava* (which is non-existence) that can be said to be unreal. *Dravya* (which is the substance), *guna* (which is quality), *karma* (which is action), *samanya* (which is the community or generality), *vishesha* (particularity) and *samavaya* (inherence) could be the final marks of existence. *Abhava* cannot be categorically defined by the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* school of philosophy but the same could be said to be of four types which are:

1. *Pragabhava* which is before non-existence could be said to be a non-existence of an effect when it comes to the material cause before production. The same then has to be the beginning and would also have an end as it will be destroyed through the production of the effect. Thus when the prior non-existence is not present then there cannot be an effect.
2. *Pradhvamsabhava* which is after non-existence, would be called the non-existence of an effect which is brought about with the destruction and thus, has no beginning or end, which means that it will not be destroyed.
3. *Atyantabhava* which is absolute non-existence, and could also be called absolute negation when it comes to the absolutely non-existent entity denial in all times and places. The same is a state of absolute abstraction.
4. *Anyonyabhava* which is mutual non-existence, could be a denial of identity of two things that have a specific nature. Here, the negation which is not the mutual negation could be the negation of relation.

The *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, the *Bhatta Mimamsa*, the *Nyaya*, and *Dvaita* schools look at *abhava* as a separate category. *Abhava* can be stated as the reality of the greatest moment when it comes to the pluralistic universe. The same is connected with *mukti*. Thus, there is a relative word, which can be used for *abhava* if there is a *bhava* previously; that is an event which is happening with time.

Thus, *abhava* can be seen as a point from where concrete *bhava* will emerge. Vasubandhu has also spoken about *Sunyata* who has the characteristic of the own-being of *abhava*, and not the characteristic consisting of *bhava* that has been observed by Sthiramati and is not redundant, that shows that *abhava* will not negate *bhava*. Here, *abhava* talks of particular entities and not of being; thus the same can be said to be a theoretical denial when it comes to the existence of a said impossibility. Here the acceptance of *abhava* could be seen as an independent *padartha* which has ontological reality and also has a peculiar feature in the Indian philosophical tradition. At the same time, the *dharmakirti* can be seen as the *abhava* and the *anumana*. Here the main idea of imaginary presence and absence has been apprehended to explain the specificity in the absence.

*Abhava*, that can be called as the non-existence, has been talked about in the *Vasheshika-Sutra*, and can be said to be the negative category along with the *padartha*. At the same time *abhava* has been described as that of two kinds, which are *samsargabhava* and *anyonyabhava*. Here, *samsargabhava* would mean the absence of something in something else. At the same time the *anyonyabhava* would mean that one thing is not another thing. Also *samsargabhava* could be said to be of three kinds, which is *pragbhava*, *atyantabhava* and *pradhvamsabhava*. At the same time, *pragbhava* or antecedent non-existence could be said to be a non-existence of a thing when its production has not been done yet or hasn't got a beginning but does have an end. *Dhvamsabhava*, at the same time talks of the non-existence of a thing when it comes to destruction after production. This something will then have a beginning but no end. At the same time, the *atyantabhava* or absolute non-existence would be the absence of a connection among things in the past, present or future. Also, *anyonyabhava* shows the difference of one thing from another. At the same time, *samsargabhava* could be said to be a relative non-existence when it comes to negation of the presence (which is the *samsarga*) of something in some other thing.

At the same time, the *anyonyabhava* could be said to be the mutual non-existence or difference which is seen in the sense of a negation when it comes to identity (*tadatmya*) among two objects. Also in the *Caraka*, the cause-effect theory can be established. Acharya Jogindranath Sen has also looked at the existence and non-existence of the theory of matter. He has not said much about the nihilistic concept, but he does talk about non-existence and the means of existence, like illumination showing the pathway of existence.

The perception which is that of non-existence could be rendered with the means of knowledge which could be said to be the *anupalabdhi*. This *pramana* or what is called the right means of knowledge would have to be admitted as the same that is claimed in the case of *kevalavyatireki* which is a matter of fact like 'when

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there is no vision in the object there would be no existence of the same since one does not have a vision of an object and the existence of the same'. The same can also be said as that there is no manner in which one can grasp the vision or want of existence. Also negative conjunction, which is seen in the case of *kevalavyatireki* cannot be really a method when one is arriving at the invariable concomitance. Here, the negative being cannot be seen as an object of perception although Naiyayikas do say that non-existence can be perceived as when one does not see a fruit on a table where it was before. Thus here one can talk of empty place of a thing for which we look out for. One can say that the non-existence is dependent on the respect of objects that are the objects of perception, and that of revelation.

The most important defects, when it comes to the medieval logistics, would be that of the illustrations which are proving the truth of revelation when seen from the observations of ordinary experiences and perceptions. When seen in this sense, the main motive of the scholars can be seen to accept the *pramanas* that are indirectly proving the metaphysical assumptions which come from revelation, and the non-perception which can be used as a *pramana* which can be used to substantiate the non-existence in the object. 'Here the non-perception of this sensible object brings in the notion of negation and the same will not come from other negations'. Advaita also sues the *anupalabdhi* of the Mimamsakas (which comes from the Kumarila School) to talk of the negation which is neither a perception nor a presence of perception. One could thus say that *abhava* could be said to be an inference which is based on this absence of perception.

One has to also ask oneself if the context in which the *pramana* is being used can also be said to be the same for *pratyaksa*, *anumana* and *sabda*.

At this point one can use the logic of negation which is what the *Advaita Vedanta* talks of when discussing fundamental contrariety among perception facts and the revelation facts. Here the word 'facts' can also be used for the designation of reality with existence of these kinds which can be phenomenal and nominal. Thus the basic difference would have to be reality or existence which can be the kinds of realities, the non-sensate (Brahmic) and the sensate. Thus the two could be seen in a sense related to each other in appearance and reality. Also the two realms could be equally present which could be facets or faces, in which one reality could follow that would grant to the appearance the permanence which will not be removed. The same brings in a difficulty when it comes to the general purpose of knowledge which says that there could be a wide divergence which can be seen among the two and the same could get rid of appearance which is equivalent to non-existence.

*Abhava* or non-existence can thus be said to be entirely different of the foregoing six substances, where non-existence could be said to be the seventh category.

Prasatapada has talked of only six categories, but in the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* sutra, non-existence was seen as in the *prameya* form. The same has been seen in the authoritative text of *Padarthadharmasamgraha* philosophy, and also been seen in detail in the *Prasastapada Bhasya*, where non-existence can be said to be an absence of an object.

Thus, nobody can deny the presence of moon on dark nights. This is thus necessary to include the parameter of non-existence.

Here one could also study the distinctions of non-existence:

There are two main distinctions when it comes to non-existence.

1. *Sansarga bhava* can be said to be the absence of one entity which is not there in another, like the absence of heat in the moon.
2. At the same time the *bhava* which is that one object is not in another like the moon is not the sun.

*Padarthadharmasamgraha* looks at existence as the highest genus that could not be said to be a genus species which is under a superior genus. Prasastapada calls the same as supreme universal which is *bhava* that comes from 'bhu' which means 'to come to be', and mentions the *bhava* which includes *dravya*, *guna* and *karma*.

This shows a clear differentiation among the material or real concepts along with the intellectual or transcendental ideas which were also present at the time of Prasastapada. Here there is the inclusion of consciousness which is the 'being' that can be said to be variable in the studies of the matter or materialistic sciences and will not hinder the understanding of matter, but will add a new dimension in this perspective.

## Guna

Next in the sequence of elements is *guna*, which is by far the foremost cause when it comes to all the effects and actions that can be seen after *dravya*. Here the existence of the *guna* along with the *dravya* will be dependent on each other and it could be very difficult to say which could be brought in the prior and the principle cause of the universe. When it comes to the philosophical aspects, the description as is seen in the Ayurvedic classics like *Charaka* states that the *guna* is also accepted as the prime and cause, and shows the secondary state which is *apradhanatva*.

Vaiseit talks about seventeen *gunas* (qualities), to which Prasastapada has added seven more qualities. The original seventeen *gunas* (qualities) can be said to be the *rupa* (colour), *gandha* (smell), *sparsa* (touch), *rasa* (taste), *saaste* (number), *pumber* (individuality), *sandivi* (conjunction/accompaniments), *parimact* (size/dimension/quantity), *vibhaga* (disjunction), *aparatva* (posteriority), *paratva* (priority), *buddhi* (knowledge), *duowle* (pain), *sukha* (pleasure), *dveas* (aversion) *iccha* (desire), and *prayatna* (effort). For Prasastapada, there was an addition of *gurutva* (heaviness), *sneha* (viscosity), *dharma* (merit), *dravatva* (fluidity), *sabda* (sound) *adharmas* (demerit), and *sanderit* (faculty).

As per *Padarthadharmasamgraha* philosophy, it can be said that quality can be a category that subsists in a substance and also there is no other quality or action which can exist.

Qualities can thus exist without substance. They can be said to be other-dependent. Also one can say that the substance can also be a material or constitutive cause when it comes to action. This can be one of the secondary helps when it comes to action. Also in view of this fact, one can say that qualities can be dependent

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upon substance. Thus, quality will also not have action or motion. The same resides inactively when it comes to the substratum, the substance. Thus, here the same differs from both substances and action.

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### Distinction of Quality

It can be said that there are twenty-four qualities, which are as follows:

- *Rasa* or taste
- *Rupa* or colour
- *Sparsa* or touch
- *Gandha* or smell
- *Parimana* or magnitude
- *Samkhya* or number
- *Sabda* or sound
- *Samyog* or conjunction
- *Prthakatva* or distinctness
- *Paratva* or remoteness
- *Vibhaga* or disjunction
- *Bodhi* or cognition
- *Aparatva* or nearness
- *Dukha* or pain
- *Sukha* or reversion
- *Dvesa* or reversion
- *Ichha* or desire
- *Gurutva* or heaviness
- *Prayatna* or effect
- *Sneha* or viscosity
- *Dravyatva* or fluidity
- *Dharma* or merit
- *Samskara* or tendency
- *Adharma* or demerit

These qualities can be further subdivided, like taste could be sweet, sour, bitter, saline, etc., and sounds could be said to be articulate and inarticulate. Here, also the magnitude could be divided into the small, medium and big. Also the numbers start from one and could go upwards.

### Conjunction and Disjunction

Conjunction could be said to be a noun which is predicated in the relation of meeting when it comes to two substances which are capable of existing along with a relation of the hand and that of the pen.

Here one can see a causal relation which is not said to be a conjunctive relation as there is a separate existence when it comes to the cause of the effect that is not possible. Disjunction is the name of the ending of conjunction and also of the separation, like what happens when the pen falls from the hand.

Thus, in the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* philosophy, there are three conjunctions which are as follows:

- **Anyatarkarmaj:** In which one substance comes and conjoins with another.
- **Ubhaya Karmaj:** In which the conjunction will happen as a result of activity which is on both the substances like when two wrestlers meet.
- **Samyogaj:** In which the conjunction takes place with the help of the medium of another conjunction, like the hand and paper which are joined if the hand touches the pen along with the pen touching the paper. The same is called *samyogaj samyog*.

Disjunction can be said to be subdivided into three. These are as follows:

- **Anyatar Karmaj:** The action of one of the substances will bring in a disjunction, like when a leaf falls off the tree.
- **Ubhaya Karmaj:** The disjunction of the two will happen with an activity which is there in both the substances like the two wrestlers breaking apart.
- **Vibhagaj:** The one disjunction will bring in another, like the conjunction among the hand and the paper which will end when the pen that was a link between the two, will be put down.

Remoteness and nearness can also be seen as two distinctions which are spatial and temporal. Here the temporal remoteness would mean the oldness while nearness would mean modernity. Also the spatial remoteness can be indicative of great distance but the spatial nearness will show proximity.

### Fluidity and Viscosity

Here the cause of liquid substances which are flowing is their fluid, like the one possessed by water would be crucial. At the same time, substances like butter will have the tendency to conjoin and then form lumps, which is a tendency called viscosity or *sneha*.

Samskara and tendency will also have three distinctions:

- **Vega:** By which the object possesses motion
- **Bhavana:** Because of which the memory of recognition of some object is present
- **Sthit Sthapakatva:** By which some substance returns from a long distance to the original position like a rubber ball.

Merit will finally be the virtue that would bring in proper activities and pleasure. Demerit will be the sin that will bring in improper activities and then cause pain. Thus the twenty four qualities will be said to be fundamental and the conjunction which can form the other compound qualities.

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**CHECK YOUR PROGRESS**

12. What are the three distinctions of samskara?
13. What are the three conjunctions of the Padarthadharmanasamgraha philosophy?
14. Define quality according to the Padarthadharmanasamgraha philosophy.

**2.6 SUMMARY**

- Hindu philosophy has been divided into six *astika* schools of thought, which are also called *darsanam*; which means 'view'.
- These accept the Vedas as the main revealed scriptures. The three *nastika* 'heterodox' schools on the other hand do not see the Vedas as the sole primary authoritative text. They have stressed on the traditions of thought.
- During the Gupta period which is known as the 'Golden Age' of Hinduism, the distinction of six orthodox schools was prevalent but with the disappearance of Vaisesika and Mimamsa, they became obsolete when the sub-schools of Vedanta like *dvaita* and *advaita* began to rise to prominence.
- The *dvaita vedanta* (which talks of dualistic conclusions of the Vedas) school of philosophy had been founded by Madhvacharya. It talks of dualism by explaining the existence of two separate realities.
- Prasastapada lists six categories in Vaisesika sutras. The categories specified consist of nine substances, seventeen qualities and five motions.
- Kanada, who was known as one of the early philosophers of *Padarthadharmanasamgraha*, has talked about the atomic view. He has been using the term '*Vishesha*' which is the particularity in an atom and also seen as the sense of '*Antya Vishesha*' which will mean the 'final individual'.
- Prasastapada, who had come many centuries after Kanada, also talks of the dissolution of earth, air, water and fire when it comes to the atomic constituents which exclude space as the nature of the same is seen as non-atomic.
- The cosmological cycle in case of the creation and dissolution when it comes to an atomic level, is a breakdown of the natural properties of atoms like the time for dissolution, till the final process of creation would be restarted and in case the natural properties hold good again, it would be a remarkable insight.
- Prasastapada made a clear distinction among enumeration (*Uddesa*) and definition and analysis (*Laksana* and *Pariksa*). For Prasastapada, the '*padartha*' are the most comprehensive parts of the enumeration.
- A knowledge of the true nature of the six categories substance, quality, action, generality, individuality and inherence through their similarities and dissimilarities, is the means of accomplishing the highest bliss.



- Vaisesikas is one of the six Hindu schools of Philosophy in India. It has been seen that the same has been closely associated to the Hindu school of logic, which is the Nyaya school.
- Quality can be divided into twenty-four sorts that is colour, taste, smell, touch, number, measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, sound, knowledge, happiness, pain, desire, hatred, effort, virtue vice and the inertia.
- One can classify different types of motions as throwing upwards, throwing downwards, expansion, contraction and other motions which are found in a straight line.
- As per the Padarthadharmasamgraha school, the things that exist, could be recognized and can be called the *padarthas*.
- It has been seen that the objects of experience could get classified in six categories, which includes the *dravya* (substance), *karma* (activity), *guna* (quality), *vishecha* (particularity), *samanya* (generality) and *samavaya* (inherence).
- One could conclude that *Padarthadharmasamgraha* talks of the visible universe which is a part of the original stock of atoms (which are called the *janim asatac*). The Brahma Sutra says '*ubhayathapi na karmatas tad-abhavai*'.
- The early *Padarthadharmasamgraha* looks at existence as the highest genus, that is, not the genus species which lies under a superior genus.
- Prasastapada names this supreme universal as the *bhava* from the root '*bhu*' which means '*to come to be*', he also mentions that this *bhava* will include the *dravya*, *guna* and *karma*.
- The *dravya* is sub-classified into five physical substances which include the *pancha bhutas*, namely, earth, water, air, fire and space.
- Action or *karma* has fundamental dynamic qualities. The inactive manifestation in the case of this substance is a quality, and the active manifestation is action.
- The concept of 'universal' could be said to be real, independent, ubiquitous that inheres in individual substances, qualities and motions which are repeatable; which could inhere in several distinct individuals at different times and places.
- *Vishesha* could mean the perceived substances which are different from one another. *Vishesha* is of two kinds: *Paryaya* and *Vyatireka*. *Paryayas* are modifications in sequence in a single substance like the elements of joy and grief in oneself.
- The *Padarthadharmasamgraha*, the *Bhatta Mimamsa*, the *Nyaya*, and *Dvaita* schools look at *abhava* as a separate category. *Abhava* could be stated as the reality of the greatest moment when it comes to the pluralistic universe.
- Conjunction could be said to be a noun which is predicated in the relation of meeting when it comes to two substances which are capable of existing along with a relation of the hand and that of the pen.

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## 2.7 KEY TERMS

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- **Vedas:** The Vedas are a large body of texts composed in Vedic Sanskrit which originated in ancient India.
- **Astika/nastika:** These are technical terms in Hinduism used to classify philosophical schools and persons, according to whether they accept the authority of the Vedas as supreme revealed scriptures, or not, respectively.

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## 2.8 ANSWERS TO 'CHECK YOUR PROGRESS'

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1. When heat is applied to substances, they could break down to the most basic entity (which is the '*paramanu*') and then get transformed into a new substance.
2. The three components of the nastika school of thought are:
  - Jainism
  - Carvaka
  - Buddhism
3. Milk could be seen to be the quasi-compound in which water could be the energizer which is present for the earth particles and in case water is extracted from milk, then the milk will still have the milky substance in it.
4. Absence (*abhava*) could be said to be the absence in the object and a notion expressed with the negative particle as per the Udayana of *Laksanavali*.
5. Quality could be divided into twenty-four sorts that is colour, taste, smell, touch, number, measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, sound, knowledge, happiness, pain, desire, hatred, effort, virtue vice and the inertia.
6. One could classify different types of motions as throwing upwards, throwing downwards, expansion, contraction and other motions which are found in a straight line. Among these, the throwing upwards can be said to be in motion and brings in disjunction at the lower portion, and conjunction which is found in the higher portion.
7. The six *padarthas* could be named as the *Samanya*, *Samavaya*, *Vishesha*, *Guna*, *Dravya*, and *Karma*.
8. Universal could be distinguished in the *para* and could be said to be the highest and all pervading, at the same time the *apara* could be said to be the lowest.
9. *Akasa* (which is the space) could be said to be a substance which accommodates living souls, the principle of motion, matter, principle of rest and time. It is infinite, all-pervading and has infinite space-points.

10. Four kinds of *prana* are:
- Indriyaprana, which includes sensational power which could be of five kinds.
  - Balaprana, the power of action of the body, speech, and mind.
  - Ayuhprana, the power of sustaining the bodily form.
  - Anapanaprana, the power of respiration.
11. *Dravya* is sub-classified into five physical substances which include the *pancha bhutas*, namely, earth, water, air, fire and space.
12. Three distinctions of *samskara* are:
- *Vega* – by why the object possesses motion
  - *Bhavana*– because of which the memory of recognition of some object is present
  - *Sthit Sthapakatva*– by which some substance returns from a long distance to the original position like a rubber ball.
13. Three conjunctions of the *Padarthdharmasamgraha* philosophy are:
- *Anyatarkarmaj* – In which one substance comes and conjoins with another.
  - *Ubhaya Karmaj* – In which the conjunction will happen as a result of activity which is on both the substances like when two wrestlers meet.
  - *Samyogaj* – In which the conjunction takes place with the help of the medium of another conjunction, like the hand and paper which are joined if the hand touches the pen along with the pen touching the paper. The same is called *samyogaj samyog*.
14. According to the *Padarthadharmsamgraha* philosophy, it can be said that quality could be a category that subsists in a substance and also there is no other quality or action which can exist.

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## 2.9 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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### Short-Answer Questions

1. Differentiate between the *astika* and *nastika* school of thoughts.
2. What are the seven *gunas* of Prasastapada?
3. Differentiate between the types of quality and motion.
4. What are the distinctions of the concept of *karma*?

### Long-Answer Questions

1. Discuss the nature of atomic combinations.
2. Discuss the six *padarthas* and analyse their *uddesa*.
3. Discuss in detail the species of *dravya*.
4. Analyse the concept of *samanya*, *vishesha* and *samanvaya* in detail.

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## 2.10 FURTHER READING

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## UNIT 3 WESTERN EPISTEMOLOGY

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### Structure

- 3.0 Introduction
- 3.1 Unit Objectives
- 3.2 Theories of Knowledge: Empiricism, Rationalism and Criticism
  - 3.2.1 Rationalism
  - 3.2.2 Empiricism
  - 3.2.3 Critical Theory of Knowledge
  - 3.2.4 Intuitionism
- 3.3 Theories of Truth
  - 3.3.1 Correspondence Theory of Truth
  - 3.3.2 Coherence Theory of Truth
  - 3.3.3 Pragmatic Theory of Truth
  - 3.3.4 Reviewing the Correspondence View
  - 3.3.5 Parameters of Truth
- 3.4 Summary
- 3.5 Key Terms
- 3.6 Answers to 'Check Your Progress'
- 3.7 Questions and Exercises
- 3.8 Further Reading

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### 3.0 INTRODUCTION

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Epistemology has been construed as that branch of philosophy which deals with problems concerning the origin, nature, validity, limits and conditions of knowledge. Epistemology probably made its first appearance in Western philosophy when the critical reflection of the Greek sophists brought the speculations of their predecessors into question. The general problems of the theory of knowledge were further enriched in the tradition of Western philosophy.

Along with metaphysics, logic and ethics, epistemology is one of the four main branches of philosophy. It is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with various theories of knowledge. It is a discipline that studies the nature, origin and limits of knowledge. It enquires into the origin of knowledge and the conditions of its validity. The term 'epistemology' is derived from the Greek words '*episteme*' and '*logos*' which mean knowledge and reason respectively. The literal meaning of epistemology is science of knowledge. It answers the question whether knowledge represents the reality or facts, or whether it consists of judgments which do not correspond to facts. Epistemology has a long history right from the ancient Greeks to the present and nearly every great philosopher has contributed to it.

The history of western epistemology, a term used as a derivation of the Greek word *episteme*, meaning 'knowledge', is the history of two schools of philosophical thought that try to find out the definition of knowledge in different possible ways. While Rationalism accepts knowledge as the product of reasoned reflection operating

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independently of our sense-experience, Empiricism, on the other hand, views knowledge as the product of sensory experiences. Critical philosophy (of Immanuel Kant) is the philosophical school which develops by criticising both Rationalism and Empiricism (at the same time) and then, establishing a reconciliation between the two.

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### 3.1 UNIT OBJECTIVES

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After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Discuss the different theories of knowledge
- Explain the theories of truth— Correspondence Theory, Coherence Theory and Pragmatic Theory of Truth

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### 3.2 THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICISM, RATIONALISM AND CRITICISM

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While studying epistemology one very often comes across various conclusions drawn by different epistemologists about problems concerning knowledge. Some epistemologists think that the presence of object is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, each and every knowledge is knowledge of both knower, and known, while others think that knowledge known is different from the knowledge of knower. Thus, different definitions and interpretations of epistemology have led to the growth of different theories of knowledge. There are four main theories of knowledge – Rationalism, Empiricism, Critical theory of knowledge and Intuitionism. There are even more theories but here we are dealing with the above four theories which are the most important among them. All these theories shed light on different aspects of knowledge. The criticism of one another by the epistemologists themselves has given rise to an interesting area in philosophy.

#### 3.2.1 Rationalism

Rationalism regards reason as the source of knowledge. The preference for reason over sense- experience as a source of knowledge began with the Eleatics in Greek thought and played a central role in Platonism. However, Descartes, who is regarded as the father of modern western philosophy is the typical exponent of rationalism. He maintains that all genuine knowledge is possible through reason alone and held that it is reason which helps us to distinguish between real and unreal. Other notable rationalists are Spinoza and Leibnitz. The rationalists maintain that there are certain fundamental principles of reality which are innate and recognized as true by reason. Hence, we can say that rationalism is a philosophy which gives importance to the role played by unaided reason, in the acquaintance and justification of knowledge.

Some important criticisms levelled against rationalism are as follows:

- The theory of rationalism gives only secondary importance to sensory perception in the achievement of knowledge. However, according to critics, it is wrong.
- The rationalists fail to provide any contention for their acceptance of ideas to be innate and they fail to agree among themselves as to how many ideas are innate.

### 3.2.2 Empiricism

Some philosophers regard empirical experience as the only source of knowledge. They hold that only through the sensations received by the sense organs one can obtain knowledge. Such a thing and approach is called empiricism. They stick to the view that all genuine knowledge is derived from sense experience and attempts to tie knowledge to experience. The British philosopher, John Locke, is considered as the father of modern empiricism. The empiricists are against the theory of innate ideas because they do not admit the existence of anything as the source of knowledge which is not the subject of sensual experience. As it was stated by G.T.W. Patrick, ‘...whatever knowledge man attains is finally rooted in and dependent upon experience. Sensation is the beginning of all knowledge and all our ideas are ultimately reducible to sensory experience.... Sound knowledge is to be obtained only by generalizations from experience.’ The culmination of empiricism is the form of skepticism which appears in the philosophy of David Hume who refuses to admit that the ideas are the object of our knowledge.

The various criticisms against empiricism include the following:

- It does not give proper explanation of perception.
- It culminates into skepticism.
- It is opposed to modern psychology.
- It does not explain the relation between ideas and concepts and the distinction between knowledge and ideas.
- It claims that mind is not active while forming concepts is wrong because it is very active while selecting sensations and forming concepts.

### 3.2.3 Critical Theory of Knowledge

Before the advent of Kant on the scene of Western philosophy, two schools of philosophy namely, empiricism and rationalism were predominant. The former was developed by John Locke and Berkeley and it reached its climax in the philosophical works of David Hume. The latter began with Descartes, developed in the thoughts of Spinoza and reached its climax in the works of Leibnitz. While Hume thought that no philosophy can be based on purely empirical grounds, Leibnitz said that all knowledge is a priori. When Hume declared that only mathematics and science were possible and philosophy was impossible as there was nothing beyond experience, Kant’s faith in empiricism was shattered. He seeks to reconcile the theories of rationalism and empiricism. He takes up thread of the doctrine of Leibnitz and

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propounded his critical theory of knowledge in his famous work *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to him, knowledge is neither wholly a priori, as rationalism maintains, nor wholly a posteriori, as empiricism maintains. He argued that both empiricism and rationalism were dogmatic; the former because it assumed validity of sensations and the latter because it assumed the existence of innate ideas. Thus, Kant was the first philosopher who presented a definite reply to the skeptical conclusions of Hume. Through his criticism of empiricism and rationalism, he showed that both were one-sided and true only in a limited sense and that we can explain the process of knowledge by a synthesis of the two of them. He admits that sensations provide knowledge but refuses to admit that sensations alone constitute our experience and knowledge. He believes in the existence of mind on the basis of our awareness of its activity.

By analysing the process of knowledge, Kant reaches the conclusion that synthetic priori judgments are possible and therefore, philosophy is possible. He asserted that pure concepts without percepts are empty and pure percepts without concepts are sightless. Thus, Kant through his critical theory of knowledge advocated that neither reason nor sense experience in isolation from each other can ever give us the genuine knowledge of reality.

### 3.2.4 Intuitionism

Intuitionism regards intuition as the organ of knowledge and it condemns reason or intellect as inadequate to the comprehension of reality. French philosopher, Henri Bergson is the advocate of intuitionism in recent times. He condemns intellect and regards intuition as the organ of true knowledge. According to G.T.W. Patrick 'The only way to know reality is through intuition which reveals a dynamic world of constant change and novelty. The essentially creative nature of the world is altogether lost in conceptual knowledge and only the intuitional experience gives a true report of it.' Intellect gives us a distorted view of reality, and Bergson criticizes it on many grounds. According to him, intellectual knowledge is conceptual knowledge and it is static, analytical and relative. On the other hand, through intuition we feel ourselves to be one with reality. Intuition knowledge is concrete and whole. It is dynamic, synthetic, absolute which gives us an internal picture of reality.

Bergson is criticized for theory of intuitionism on the following grounds. Philosophy is bound to rest on intellectual knowledge and it cannot give a reasoned view of reality based on intuition alone. Intellect and intuition both are necessary and they must admit of analysis and synthesis. The verdict of intuition must be rational. Bergson himself justifies the result of his intuition by appealing to rational arguments.

#### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Who is regarded as the father of modern empiricism?
2. What is intuitionism?
3. Name some of the important theories of knowledge.




### 3.3 THEORIES OF TRUTH

Whenever we analyze a scene, whenever we analyze a statement, whenever we recall a memory, whenever we do anything with our brain, we are on a quest for truth. Our cognitive life is a continuous struggle for truth—Is she home tonight? Will my flight take off on time? Why did the Roman Empire fall? Our mind, ultimately, is an organ to identify truth. The meaning of our life is truth.

The three significant theories of truth are as follows:

#### 3.3.1 Correspondence Theory of Truth

The Correspondence theory of truth is sometimes also called the ‘Theory of Accordance’. This theory establishes that the truth is established by maintaining a relationship between ‘a belief about X’ and a corresponding fact about ‘the same X in the real world’. As we see, this is a ‘theory of common-sense’. In fact, we all usually presume that whenever we have a belief, then that belief is established to be either true or false by its corresponding relationship to the physical-external world and not by its corresponding relation to other belief (or others beliefs). Let us take some examples to make this viewpoint clearer— my belief that my house has a king-size bed becomes true only if it corresponds to a specific fact about my house; however, another belief that there is a mountain in my house is false as it does not correspond to that specific fact about my house. Though we have used examples from the external-physical world only, this theory is applicable to our beliefs about the internal or the experiential world as well. For example, my belief that I suffered from a severe headache two days back is confirmed to be true only by the fact that I *actually* had severe headache two days back. This theory may be diagrammatically summarized as follows:



*Fig. 3.1 Correspondence Theory of Truth*

**Criticisms:** The correspondence theory seems to be apparently true and is accepted as such. However, there are three criticism which should be considered before accepting this theory wholeheartedly:

- The term ‘belief’ (or judgment) is used here for what is either true or false. Sometimes this might be understood as only referring to ‘our mental states of believing’, i.e. what is believed. However, these mental states of believing cannot be accepted as purely true or false. Consequently, this theory can only be applied to ‘belief’ (or judgment) in a specific sense (of what is believed or judged). It seems more appropriate to use the term ‘proposition’ here, as it is only a proposition which can be purely true or false. Though sometimes, we use the term ‘statement’ as true (but it is to be remembered that a statement becomes true only when it stands for a proposition which is true). Such a

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discussion would inevitably lead to regard these propositions as entities which are autonomous and independent in nature. Such understanding of the proposition makes them entities that are bizarre—totally unrelated with the real world. So some of the philosophers accepted them as nothing else but the elements in the states of mind in people. In such a case, the correspondence theory would be dealing with nothing but the ‘hypothetical states of mind’. Thus, to accept the proposition ‘S is P’ true would only mean that if some mind would be judging S is P, then the mind would be judging truly. Even if we accept this, the falsity of any judgment would still depend upon something which is not mind. It is just like as in an examination: there would be no answers to examine, if there are no appearing students. But it does not imply that the rightness (correctness) of an answer depends upon the student.

- The term correspondence itself gives us the idea that whenever we propose a judgment which is true, we already have some kind of picture of the real (external) in our mind. To say that the judgment is true, implies, that this picture corresponds to the real. In the process of judging, the images (or pictures) used might *resemble* the external or physical entities and might seem like their copies. However, a judgment does not use any such image (or picture) apart from the words and these words are neither the copies nor the resembling images of the external-physical entities. For example, while uttering the statement ‘The flower is beautiful’, the word ‘flower’ does not use any imagery of a flower in the form of a copy of any other resembling physical thing. What it uses is simply the word ‘flower’ which not even in the minimum possible sense is similar to the thing ‘flower’ it intends to represent. Consequently, the correspondence should not mean *resemblance* or *copying*.
- The correspondence theory should never be positioned in such a manner so as to propose that we are only aware of our judgments (or propositions) but never of the real things, because if such was the case, we might never have been able to find out what they actually correspond to. For example, we can never look at the painting of an Indian king and decide whether the painting is a good representation of the person or not, if we have never seen the real person.

Most of the times, the correspondence theory seems to suffer from one of the abovementioned criticisms. That is why, the thinkers continued to propose further theories which might establish a better definition of truth without accepting the notion of correspondence.

### 3.3.2 Coherence Theory of Truth

Under the influence of the idealists (like Hegel and others), a new theory was proposed in nineteenth century called ‘the coherence theory’. This theory proposed that the truth is not established by a relationship of correspondence between a judgment and a real entity, but by establishing a relation of coherence between different judgments (about the same entity). This theory seems relatively more successful in solving the problem of corresponding relationship between judgment and non-judgment. This theory proposes further that since no system is absolutely coherent,

therefore no judgment can be absolutely true in nature. However, some judgments seem closer to the ideal; therefore they are truer than the others. In this way, the supporters of the coherence theory accept the ‘degrees of truth’ i.e. a judgment may be less true or more true depends on its closeness to the ideal. The coherence theory may be diagrammatically summarized as follows:




Fig. 3.2 Coherence Theory of Truth

**Criticisms:** The coherence theory seems to be successful and is accepted as such. However, there are three criticism of it which should be considered before accepting this theory wholeheartedly:

- The acceptance of ‘degrees in truth’ might lead to confusion which might be controversial in nature because then it would seem that the judgments like ‘New Delhi is the capital of India’ and ‘ $7 + 5 = 10$ ’ may not be *absolutely* (objectively) true in nature, but only *true in degree*. Such a conclusion seems apparently unacceptable in nature. However, the supporters of the coherence theory might argue that the term ‘truth’ is not used by them in the ordinary sense; neither are they attempting to propose a definition of the term ‘truth’ in some ordinary sense, rather it is used in some exceptional sense. The prime motive of the thinkers should be to propose a definition of the truth in its most ordinary sense.
- There is a difficulty in defining ‘coherence’ itself in the absence of an already pre-supposed truth. For example, to propose a judgment that ‘X is coherent with Y’ would mean that either X follows Y *necessarily* or X is consistent with Y. Both of these understandings should presume some notion of truth, i.e. the judgment ‘X is consistent with Y’ presumes that ‘X and Y both are true’ and ‘if Y is true, X has to be true’. Thus, the supporters of the coherence theory have to presume some definition of truth, thereby committing *the circular fallacy*.
- Lastly, it is quite apparent that a judgment becomes true not because of its relationship with any number of other judgments but simply because of its presumed relationship with some objective entity (i.e. non-judgment).

All of the abovementioned criticisms take us back to the prior position of correspondence theory which has already been criticized (as above). Therefore, the thinkers attempt to propose some new theory of truth.


### 3.3.3 Pragmatic Theory of Truth

A new theory of truth was introduced by the pragmatist school on the basis of criticisms posed against the correspondence and the coherence theories. Pragmatism

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is the recent philosophical school which originated in United States with thinkers like C.S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey and it is based on the acceptance of the contents of any hypothesis by tracing its 'practical consequence'. According to them, the best definition of truth may only be represented as such beliefs which 'work' for us. This view is accepted on the presumption that the absolute truth is unattainable and so, we should be content with accepting that truth which works for us. No doubt in our everyday life, a true belief would anyway work better for us than any false belief (However, it should not imply that this is precisely what should be accepted as the final truth). The pragmatists would argue that the objectives of our everyday life have been decided on the basis of their 'practical success' and not on some theoretical truth. They would emphasize that the practical success is what really matters for us and therefore should be preferred over a theory. Though they do accept that such a true belief must correspond with our experiences or at least be consistent with each-other, but they will emphasize that this is simply so because if they are not corresponding to the experiences or are not consistent with each-other, they would not 'work'. The pragmatic theory may be diagrammatically summarized as follows:



*Fig. 3.3 Pragmatic Theory of Truth*

**Criticisms:** The pragmatic theory seems to be more acceptable than the previous theories. However, there are three criticism which should be considered before accepting this theory wholeheartedly:

- It is quite possible that a belief might be true and still not work for us. On the other hand, there might be a belief which works perfectly, but might not be true. For example, a sugar-candy might work as a perfect placebo for a psychological patient (provided he believes it to be actual cure for his problem), but this does not make the sugar-candy as the true cure of the problem and thereby, does not make the belief true.
- It is acceptable that a true belief usually works for us but this is simply because they are true at the very first place. For example, it is usually advisable for a person to believe that a train is coming towards him when this is true, for if he does not believe in it then he might be run over by the train. However, it is so to be noted that such a belief is advisable only and only when there is *really* a train coming towards him, i.e. only and only when the belief is true at the very first place.
- It is quite possible that a belief which works for one person might not work for others. It might also be the possibility that a belief which works for a person for the first time might not work for him the other time. In such a case, when it stops to work, should we imply that it has stopped to be true or that it remains true for one person while false for others? For example, if some men get benefitted by their belief in the existence of God (as a psychological-

spiritual support) while the others have benefitted by the belief in the non-existence of God (as it provides a feel of more autonomy and individuality), then both of these contradictory views cannot be true at the same time. These views are incompatible because God cannot exist and not exist simultaneously. Let us take another example: the belief in the reality of a system which is completely determined by our destiny might have worked for some people (as a moral consolation) while the belief in completely undetermined free will might have worked for some others (as an incentive to work better). But both these views are incompatible and cannot be accepted as true simultaneously. As a matter of fact, if a proposition has to be accepted as true, then it ought to be true for all (and for all times). Can there be a truth only for few people (for whom it has worked) and false for all others (for whom it has not)? Several pragmatists have readily accepted this as a *subjective theory of truth* but it is apparently difficult for the ordinary people to accept it in such a way. For example, if human race has evolved from apes, it will be true always that it happened and would not become false for the some other generation of human race when the after effects of such a belief happens to be disadvantageous (as in the dark ages) and true again in some other generation (as in the age of modern science).

- The supports of the correspondence theory would criticize the pragmatic theory on the same ground on which they criticized the coherence theory, where they accept that the truth or falsity of a belief should be determined by its relationship with some external-objective entity and not simply by its successful performance as a belief.

### 3.3.4 Reviewing the Correspondence view

While the correspondence view is accepted as applicable for most of the truths, still unless we are able to provide a clear-cut definition of correspondence, it does not provide us sufficient information. However, such a clear-cut definition of the term has not been provided yet. But this also does not provide enough grounds to reject the theory, for it might be the case that the correspondence is indefinable in nature. However, if we accept the indefinability of truth, then we also have to accept that it provides nothing significant to us, for then it has done nothing but simply replaced the term 'truth' with some technical but indefinable term 'correspondence'. It only serves to draw our attention to something which may be ignored by some thinkers but still is quite an apparent fact. If such is the case, then there would be no issue in accepting that truth is indefinable and it is simply a relationship established between the proposition and fact, without proposing a clear-cut definition of this relation and simply replacing it with a technical term. Also, it might be said that the theory of correspondence is applicable only on a particular kind of true propositions and not on all other kinds of propositions. For example, it is quite difficult to apply this theory on the propositions dealing with future as there would be nothing to correspond to. It is also difficult to apply the theory on propositions as hypothesis, as neither the antecedent nor the consequent relate with any fact. For example, 'If I own all the gold in Fort Knox, I would be rich' or 'If I have six children, then I should have three boys and

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three girls'. Now, in the existing world, there is no such fact to which abovementioned propositions may correspond, but still these propositions are regarded as true. In fact, such hypotheses are quite significant for motivating or forbidding us to take a particular course of action.

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An important point worth mentioning here is that by establishing the indefinability of truth, we do not intend to say that nothing can be known about it. This indefinability simply means that 'it cannot be analyzed in terms of something else'. This is *not* an unreasonable view. In fact, if there has to be a definition, we have to admit some indefinable, otherwise we would fall into the fallacy of *infinite regress*. If such is the case, the truth would be treated like some other concepts. In fact, it is so primary that it seems impossible to find out anything more primary in terms of which it can be analyzed. If we intend to differentiate 'indefinable' from 'undefined', the only point would be that some experience must be available to us in which significant traits of indefinable may be observed immediately. Here, we refer to one of the most common example taken by thinkers according to which, the particular yellow colour cannot be analyzed in terms of any other colour. That is why, it is not possible to explain yellow to a person who has never seen it before. Similarly, sometimes we immediately know something to be true with absolute certainty, although we cannot explain or define the term. After understanding the notion of truth with the help of experiences, we may apply it to dubitable propositions. So though the truth is indefinable, still the thinkers might discuss about its relationship, parameters and its qualifiers.

### 3.3.5 Parameters of Truth

The definition of truth should be separated from the parameters of knowing the truth. In most of the cases, the people confuse between the two, but it is quite possible that a person might know the definition but not the parameters for its identification (or vice-versa). Thus, it seems better to deal with the issue of definition of truth and its parameters separately. The only possible way of determining such parameters is to find out the various kinds of established and accepted definitions of knowledge and see whether the parameters provided are sufficient enough to establish their truth. There is no means of establishing what a parameter should be *apriori* - we have to trace them out of ordinary cases. In case of any direct sense-experience, we may directly accept 'correspondence' as the parameter of truth, as we may observe the fact immediately and find out whether the correspondence is established or not. However, we might discover later that it is quite difficult to accept direct experience of any external-physical entity.

What should be the parameters of such instances? Some thinkers may suggest that the most appropriate parameters would be 'coherence'. In fact, coherence seems a more suitable parameter to differentiate between *real* and *illusory* perception. It may also be used to decide between rival scientific theories. We have numerous instances where we swiftly reject sense-perceptions simply because they do not form a coherent (and consistent) system with other perceptions, as in the case of our dreams. We do not believe our dreams once we are awake, simply because our dreaming state do not establish coherence with the perception of our

waking lives. For example, I might have dream of winning a million dollar lottery, but the moment I wake up, I realize that the dream is not coherent with the real life and so, cannot be true. Not only in the dreaming state but even the perceptions of our waking life might seem equally dodgy in nature. It is not infrequent that the same physical entity might appear of different shapes, sizes and colours depending upon the position of perceiver. For example, a straight rod may appear bent inside the water but such a perception does not cohere with the fact outside water. Thereby, it would not be wrong to say that coherence (agreement) plays a significant role as the parameter of truth. In fact, it may be accepted as the only parameter by which we can differentiate correct perception from the illusory one.

Enough emphasis has been laid on perception; however it is still dubitable that whether a proposition could be established by observation alone? For example, Galileo's claim to have discovered the satellites of Jupiter with his newly invented telescope was completely rejected by his stubborn religious opponents on the ground that looking through the telescope (for verifying Galileo's claims) might produce illusory images caused by some devilish act. No matter how immature this argument may seem, we have to admit that it is logically acceptable. Do not we all reject our beliefs as illusory on the same grounds (only that we do not attribute this illusion to some devilish act, but to our own sensations)? The perception of these objects do not cohere with other standards and so are outrightly rejected.

The supporters of the coherence theory of truth do accept that perfect coherence is an impossibility—an unachievable idea. But still the judgments may be given on the basis of their degree of proximity to the idea. The best example might be found in the field of mathematics. We find that numerous mathematical propositions are so well-connected with each other that we cannot deny anyone of them without rejecting most of them. For example, rejecting the proposition ' $1 + 1 = 2$ ' would not only lead to the denial of this proposition, but each and every arithmetical truth about any possible number. In order to be successful, a theory must be consistent with the experiential facts, but it would be a mistake to understand coherence only in terms of consistency. It is quite possible that the true propositions are not incompatible but still are logically autonomous. For example, 'New Delhi is the capital of India' and 'I have a headache since morning' are not inconsistent but still logically unconnected propositions. A successful theory should not only test consistency but also attempt to bring these logically consistent facts under the same set of laws. These sets of laws may be identified on the basis of two considerations: either the laws are reconciled with our experiences or they increase the coherence of our experiences, so as to make the best sense of it. We might presume it in, let's say, a murder case where the detective accepts that theory to be plausible which incorporates all available evidences into a complete and coherent system.

The discussion, in no way, establishes that coherence by itself is a self-sufficient parameter. We should rather accept coherence with experience. Most of the supporters of coherence would agree that 'coherence with experience' actually means 'coherence with propositions based on experience'. Thus, we are not only searching for coherent propositions but such coherent propositions which also

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correspond with our experiences. Without adding the parameter of correspondence, the parameter of coherence cannot ever incorporate the empirical element of truth.

Here are also some other shortcomings in a completely coherent theory apart from its avoidance of empirical facts. The supporters of coherence theory would deny that any proposition might be self-validated; rather they would say they are validated by the fact that they form a complete and coherent system.

Apart from coherence with experience, some other parameters are also required to cover the complete system of knowledge and justified beliefs. We may consider that a parameter is 'coherence with immediate cognitions' in general. The term 'immediate cognition' here means direct awareness or cognition achieved other than that by the inferential process. In this way, it would cover almost all intuitions, sensations and introspections.

While the parameters of the correspondence attempt to include all possible parameters under direct awareness, which would be an incomplete theory as we do make inferences beyond our immediate experiences as well. In the same way, to accept coherence theory as the only parameter would be incomplete without accepting coherence with immediate cognitions and this admission would blur the gap between the correspondence and the coherence.

It is evident that just one parameter of truth is not sufficient enough to serve the purpose— neither correspondence nor coherence can claim to be suitable and sufficient for all types of truth. This is simply because both are *apriori* in nature. Thereby, we have to admit a third parameter in form of intuition. Since all inferential processes presuppose intuitions by which they proceed from one stage to another. Since intuition is related with such facts which can neither be accepted nor rejected by sense-experiences, coherence gives a particularly significant test for them: but coherence is also inevitable for constructing our ordinary conception of the external-physical world and of human mind.

The above discussion has finally established that there are two minimum requirements for knowledge and construction of the beliefs. These are as follows:

- Active construction and systematization by our mind
- Some objective ground totally independent of mind working as the foundation for its function

While radical empiricism ignores the prior one, most of the forms of coherence and pragmatism ignore the latter one. It is generally well accepted that if a proposition is true, then most of the times (though not every time), it will work well and a belief which is false, would not. So the practical success of a belief may provide a common parameter which will have fair possibilities for the truth of propositions. However, such parameter should not be accepted as indubitable. After all, how do we come to know that a belief does not work for us? Is it simply because of the reason that the expected consequence has not followed? But such a parameter would reject the parameters provided by every other theory. It should be remembered here that the falsity of a belief is deduced from its conflict with our experiences and not with its practical success. A belief which is false gets rejected. It is also to be noted that we accept a variety of propositions simply by our perception and inferential without



verifying whether it works or not. As we do not always presume our perceptions to be correct and we do not see the conclusion of (at least) our inductions to be logically deduced. We have to give our judgment on the basis of certain general presupposition which can be only established by their 'working success.'

The pragmatist theory seems to be just an attempt to establish our belief in the inductive process, i.e. the process where we move from the perceived to the unperceived and such a process is justified on the basis that it has worked in several previous instances. However, it provides no guarantee that it will work successfully in the future as well, unless it is presumed that the applicability of the inductive principles beforehand is being attempted to justify in the end. There is a possibility where we may take a sager recourse by accepting the term 'working' to mean systematically arranged experiential facts, but if we do so, we would get back to accepting the coherence theory of truth.

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### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

4. What are the different theories of truth?
5. What is Theory of Correspondence also referred as?
6. What is the Coherence Theory?

## 3.4 SUMMARY

- Rationalism regards reason as the source of knowledge. The preference for reason over sense- experience as a source of knowledge began with the Eleatics in Greek thought and played a central role in Platonism.
- Some philosophers regard empirical experience as the only source of knowledge. They hold that only through the sensations received by the sense organs one can obtain knowledge. Such a thing and approach is called empiricism.
- By analysing the process of knowledge, Kant reaches the conclusion that synthetic priori judgments are possible and therefore, philosophy is possible. He asserted that pure concepts without percepts are empty and pure percepts without concepts are sightless.
- Intuitionism regards intuition as the organ of knowledge and it condemns reason or intellect as inadequate to the comprehension of reality.
- The correspondence theory is a 'common-sense' theory which establishes that the truth is established by maintaining a relationship between a belief about X and a corresponding fact about the same X in the real world.
- On the basis of the arguments posed as criticism of correspondence, a new theory was proposed by the Idealists. This theory of coherence proposed that the truth is not established by a relationship of correspondence between a judgment and a real entity, but by establishing a relation of coherence between different judgments about the same entity.

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- The grounds of rejections presented against the correspondence and the coherence theories, the pragmatists argued that the best definition of truth may only be represented as such beliefs which ‘work’ for us.
- An impartial review of the correspondence theory established that while the correspondence view is accepted as applicable for most of the truths, still a clear-cut definition of the term has not been provided yet.
- There are at least two minimum requirements for knowledge and construction of the beliefs: (i) Active construction and systematization by our mind and (ii) Some objective ground totally independent of mind working as the foundation for its function.

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### 3.5 KEY TERMS

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- **Empiricism:** Empiricists believe that knowledge can be gained through observation and experience.
- **Epistemology:** The philosophical study of the nature and limitation of human knowledge.
- **Perception:** The process of gaining information about the world or oneself via the senses of touch, taste, sight, smell and hearing.
- **Rationalism:** Rationalists emphasize the role of reason in establishing the knowledge. Many believe that we are born with the preformed capacity.
- **Skepticism:** The philosophical doubt that challenges our claim to knowledge.
- **Pragmatism:** It is based on the acceptance of the contents of any hypothesis by tracing its ‘practical consequence’.

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### 3.6 ANSWERS TO ‘CHECK YOUR PROGRESS’

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1. John Locke is regarded as the father of modern empiricism.
2. Intuitionism regards intuition as the organ of knowledge and it condemns reason or intellect as inadequate to the comprehension of reality.
3. Some of the important theories of knowledge are: Rationalism, Empiricism, Critical theory of knowledge and Intuitionism.
4. The different theories of truth are:
  - Theory of Correspondence
  - Theory of Coherence
  - Theory of Pragmatism
5. The Correspondence Theory of truth is also known as the ‘Theory of Accordance’.
6. Coherence theory proposed that the truth is not established by a relationship of correspondence between a judgment and a real entity, but rather by establishing a relation of coherence between different judgments (about the same entity).

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## 3.7 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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### Short-Answer Questions

1. Write a short note on John Locke's theory of knowledge.
2. Name the theories of knowledge.
3. Give an account of the different theories of epistemology.
4. What is Henry Bergson's theory of Intuitionism?
5. What is the source of knowledge according to empiricism? What are the main criticisms levelled against this?
6. What is the correspondence theory of truth?

### Long-Answer Questions

1. Explain briefly the theory of knowledge in Kantian thought.
2. What are the criticism of Theory of Correspondence?
3. Write a detailed account on the Theory of Coherence and the theory of Correspondence.
4. Critically analyze the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Why is it called the 'Theory of Accordance' or the 'Common-sense Theory'? Discuss.
5. Do you agree that the coherence theory is an improvement over the correspondence theory? If yes, how?
6. The pragmatic theory is based on the truth which 'usually' works (practical success). What if it does not work? Will it cease to be truth? Give reasons for your answer.
7. Can the truth be accepted as indefinable? What is the difference between 'indefinable' and 'undefined'?
8. Write a detailed account on theories of knowledge.
9. Is this belief true that 'The sun will rise tomorrow'? Justify with reference to the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth.

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## 3.8 FURTHER READING

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- Audi, R. 1998. *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* London: Routledge.
- Dancy, J. 1996. *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Morton, A. 2001. *A Guide through the Theory of Knowledge*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Trusted, J. 1997. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- William, M. 2001. *Problems of Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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## UNIT 4 WESTERN METAPHYSICS

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### Structure

- 4.0 Introduction
- 4.1 Unit Objectives
- 4.2 Realism
  - 4.2.1 Naïve Realism
  - 4.2.2 Representative Realism
- 4.3 Idealism
- 4.4 Substance: Empiricists' and Rationalists' View
- 4.5 Causality
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  - 4.5.2 Theory of Entailment
  - 4.5.3 Activity Theory
- 4.6 Summary
- 4.7 Key Terms
- 4.8 Answers to 'Check Your Progress'
- 4.9 Questions and Exercises
- 4.10 Further Reading

### NOTES

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### 4.0 INTRODUCTION

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In our everyday life, we presume that our sense-experiences provide us with the knowledge of physical world and whenever we are questioned about the certainty of the empirical knowledge, we usually respond that if we have seen object X, smelled it, tasted or touched it, we do not have any reason to doubt its existence. In any such cases, we do not contemplate whether we actually achieve the knowledge of the nature and the existence of the objects in the physical world simply because of our sense-experiences. The philosophers do raise questions on such seemingly indubitable presumptions.

It may be asked, why should they be questioned? After all, the belief in a physical world known by sense-experiences seems evident—the existence of mountains, trees and rivers around us seems unquestionable. When we see the things in front of ourselves, we might describe them as for example, a set of books, a pen-holder, a rim of papers, etc. and if we have to verify their existence, we might simply see them, touch them or use other senses and clear our doubts. If this is so simple, what is that creates problem for the philosophers? Nevertheless, many of such beliefs about the physical existence based upon our common sense have been questioned, doubted and discussed leading to emergence of different metaphysical schools of western philosophy.

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## 4.1 UNIT OBJECTIVES

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After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Discuss western metaphysics including Realism and Idealism
  - Explain Substance and Causality in philosophy
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## 4.2 REALISM

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A common man who has not pondered over the issues related to perception, the reality of the physical world and has accepted them *as they are*, is termed as ‘realist’. Realism is the indubitable belief in the existence of the physical world—whether we perceive it or not. It is the belief that several things may be known about this physical world. The metaphysical school of realism is divided into two sub schools:


- Naïve Realism and
- Representative Realism

### 4.2.1 Naïve Realism

The general sense of the word ‘naive’ is having ingenious and unsophisticated simplicity of nature. It is a simplistic, unaffected and direct style of thinking with little or no use of technicalities of the discipline. Naïve Realism is the acceptance of the following beliefs:

- A world of physical objects (e.g. mountains, rivers, trees etc.) actually exists.
- Verification of the statements related to these physical objects is possible only through sense-experiences.
- The physical objects are totally independent of our perception i.e. they exist not only when perceived but even when nobody perceives them.
- Our sensory perceptions provide us the physical objects exactly as they are. It means that our knowledge claims are well justified.

All these four beliefs are usually accepted by each and every ordinary person and thereby forms the metaphysical school called naïve realism. Naïve Realism may be diagrammatically summarized as follows:



However, all of the abovementioned beliefs might be questioned and analyzed by the philosophers. Following criticism may be posed against these beliefs:

- Our perceptions depend, wholly or partially, on the nature of our sense-organs. For example, if our eyes would have been different (as the compound eyes in case of a cockroach), we would have seen the world differently. If our auditory organs would have been different (as in the case of dogs who are capable of hearing ultrasonic whistles), we would have heard sounds differently.

Consequently, we have no ground to believe that we perceive the objects as they really are. In fact, we could never have a fair knowledge of how the things really are? For example, if we press our eyelids with our fingers, we see everything in double, or if our eyes are not positioned as they are, we would not have been able to see 3-D images of the objects or if we were devoid of rods and cones in our retina, we would not have been able to see different colours. Innumerable such examples may be presented to show that our perception depends, at least partially, on the nature of our sense organs. As long as our sense-data is dependent upon our sense organs and as long as we are not able to remove our sense organs like our contact lenses or our hearing aids, we may never be certain whether we perceive the physical objects as they really are. In such a scenario, the claim made by the naïve realism regarding the actuality of the physical world seems to be a dubious one.

- Even if we accept our sense organs as they presently are, there may be a number of instances where the things are not perceived as they really are. For example, the same straight stick might appear bent in water, the same pink rose may appear purple in bluish light, the same train whistle might appear to be of higher pitch when the train is approaching and of lower pitch when the train is receding. All these are called *illusions*. No doubt we attempt to differentiate between our perceptions and illusions, but reliability of these distinctions still remain a dubious one.
- Sometimes, we also perceive things which are not even there. This seems to be a more radical way of proving that there might be appearances without any reality. For example, a drunkard might see a serpent in a dark alley when there is nothing in actuality or we may hear the footsteps on the door when we are eagerly waiting for someone.

All these seem to be more radical kind of errors in our perception than the illusions. Up to now, we have only perceived the nature of the things differently, but now we even perceive the non-existing objects. All these we call *hallucinations*.

- All these criticisms of naïve realism are further extended to lead to a surprising conclusion—If our senses seem to deceive sometimes, then what is the guarantee that they would not deceive us all the times? May be this whole physical world is a grand hallucination or a tactful deception?

For some commentators, Descartes' most powerful argument against naïve realism is his arch-demon argument where he questions as to how we know for certain that all our sense-experiences are not being fed to us artificially by some evil intelligence or arch-deceiver. Clearly, if this is true, then we would be in no position to verify or to falsify it. All physical objects, therefore, are full of doubts and then, what is the only thing which a person could not doubt? It is only the doubter who indubitably exists, at least during the process of doubting.

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## 4.2.2 Representative Realism

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
Representative Realism was expounded by John Locke (1632-1704). This sub school of realism developed on the belief that though there are physical objects existing independently of our sense experiences, but they are not exactly like what they appear to us. An ordinary man may identify a physical object on the basis of its certain qualities like shape, size, colour, etc. But the school of representative realism would hold that all these qualities should not be considered to be of the same kind. John Locke divided these qualities into two kinds— primary and secondary.

The primary qualities of physical objects are those qualities which exist independently of any sense perception. In other words, they would be there even if there were no perceivers around in general, these are *measurable* qualities. For example, shape, size, weight, etc. These qualities are intrinsic to the objects. However, there are also secondary qualities like smell, taste, colour, etc. which do not exist independently of the perceiver. In general, these are not the qualities of the objects, but of the sense organs. Let us take an example of the colour: An object might be of one particular colour in broad daylight, of some different colour in the evening and of black colour at night. So this indicates that the colour of the object depends on the factors other than the physical object itself. Not only this, but its colour also depends upon the perceiver. For example, a person suffering from jaundice might perceive everything to be yellowish in colour (though they are not) and a colour blind person would not observe any colour in the object (though he will still perceive the shape).

Similar observations may be given about other secondary qualities as well. For example, our cup of tea would taste sweeter when taken after a salty snack, but the same cup of tea would taste less sweet when taken after sweet cookies. A fragrant rose would be without smell for us if we are suffering from cold. Consequently, there can be no such thing as real colour, taste, smell, etc.

According to Locke, these secondary qualities are not inherent in the physical objects but they are merely ideas which we receive from the secondary qualities of an object. Thereby, the secondary qualities are nothing but the power to produce specific sense experience in the perceiver so the objects are neither blue, nor red in themselves but these are the powers (in the object) to produce the ideas of red and blue colour in our mind.

Representative Realism may be summarized in the following diagram:



Such Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities was reconsidered by Bishop George Berkeley, who was of the belief that there is no ground for maintaining a Lockean distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities. Some of the main reasons proposed by him were as follows:

- **Inseparability:** Berkeley believed that the secondary qualities are inseparable from the primary ones, i.e. if the physical object does not have one then it



cannot have the other. For example, the shape and colour of a physical object are inseparable qualities. We cannot fill up the colour unless we have a shape present. In fact, shape is nothing but the limit of the colour.

- **Variability:** Berkeley argues that a thing may appear of different colours in different contexts (of the perceiver). These conditions might be of the environment or of the perceiver. If such variability means subjectivity, then it might be extended to primary qualities as well. A thing will appear of different shapes when perceived from different angles, for example, a coin might look circular from one angle and elliptical from the other. Similarly, the size might vary according to the distance between the perceiver and the perceived object. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that shape and size are as variable as smell and colour are.

If the variability of a physical object under different conditions of perception proves that the object doesn't have a particular quality, then not only the secondary ones but all qualities may also be rejected for the object. As far as the criterion of measurability is concerned, it can also be resolved now. The secondary qualities which were considered immeasurable in Lockean times may well be measured now. For example, colours may be measured in terms of wave-lengths, smell may be measured in terms of serial-order and so on. Hence, even measurability would not serve as a sufficient distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Therefore, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities cannot be accepted any more as both set of qualities possess their physical (primary) and experiential (secondary) aspects. It may be said that both set of terms may be used in both the ways i.e. physical and experiential qualities.

- **Resemblance:** Locke has supposed that the ideas (sense-experiences) of the primary qualities are resemblances of the same qualities in the physical objects, while the secondary qualities are not. But here, Berkeley would argue that there is no way of knowing that our sense-perceptions of the primary qualities resemble the same qualities in the physical objects or not. After all, how can we compare our experience of shape with the real shape when we do not have access to the real shape of the object?

Therefore, Berkeley argues that 'an idea can resemble nothing but another idea'. This means that our sense-perception can be compared only with other sense-perception and not with the so-called cause of our sense-perception. Thus, Locke's concept of the real cause of the quality seems to lead only to some kind of skepticism.

- **Causality:** If our mind has acquaintance with only its own ideas, then there is no sense in saying that our sense-perceptions are caused by the physical objects. Let us extend this skeptic argument regarding the properties of physical objects 'as they really are' and 'as they appear to be.' Are our experiences regarding the causality of the physical objects as flimsy as they are in context of their qualities? If we accept that 'P causes Q' then we should be able to have sense-experience of both P and Q and should also

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observe some relationship of regularity or correlation between them if we want to accept a causal relation between them, but as is the case, we do have access to Q that is the sense-experience but we do not have any possible access to P that is the physical object as it is completely independent of our sense-experiences. P is always before our sense-experience and it can be known by us through our own sense-experience, we cannot claim to be aware of something which is not our sense-experience and thus, we cannot prove that a physical object P actually exists apart from our sense-experience of it.

**CHECK YOUR PROGRESS**

1. Define realism.
2. Name the two sub schools of realism.
3. Who expounded representative realism and what was it based on?

**4.3 IDEALISM**

The metaphysical school of idealism stands quite opposite to realism. It holds that it is the ideas (and not the sense-experiences) which make up the fundamental reality. The metaphysical school of idealism is divided into two sub schools:

- Subjective Idealism
- Objective Idealism

**1. Subjective Idealism:** Until now, we have conferred that according to Bishop George Berkeley, John Locke does not seem able to provide adequate justification for upholding his view about the existence of external-physical world. According to Berkeley, Locke seems committed to some sort of agnosticism pertaining to the physical world, for he claims its existence but rejects all the possibilities of knowing it (in any possible world). This view itself rejects his own theory about the physical world and its qualities. Berkeley takes a positive position on this. He attempts to posit that we do not have sufficient ground to accept the existence of some physical world outside our mind, but claims that no such physical world exists at all. By saying so, he does not reject the existence of objects: what he rejects is their existence in the outside world—totally independent of our mind. In context of this viewpoint, he is called an *Idealist*.

The word ‘idealist’ is derived from the word ‘idea’ meaning ‘all that exists is mind and its ideas, and there is no external existence’. According to idealism, it is not the case that the physical objects exist first and then comes their sensation (which resembles or copies the object). There is only the sensation of objects existing inside the mind. Even if we presume the existence of physical object totally independent of our sense-experiences, we could not know them and thus, such a presumption is not going to help us in any possible way. As such, all that exists in our mind and its experiences, with no external-physical objects to induce these experiences. After all, there seems no reason to first accept our experience of the object and then the existence of the external-physical object totally independent of our experiences.

While the first one is extremely needed and is sufficient, the second one is absolutely unneeded. After all, we do have the experience of the objects without there being any objects at all. For example, if we are having a hallucination and we believe that we see a snake (when there is not any), we are still having the *snake-experience*, but not the *experience of the snake*.

Berkeley does believe that there are snakes, but not that our snake-experiences are due to the snake that is caused by the external-physical snakes existing independently of our minds. According to him, the snakes (and in that case every other physical object) are simply the names used for conglomerations of our experiences. What then is the meaning of a conglomeration (or a patterned group) of sense-experiences? Let us take the same example of the snake to clarify:

- The appearance of the snake changes in an orderly pattern. ‘When I go near, it looks bigger but when I go away, it looks smaller and when I go near it again, it again looks bigger.’ So, its apparent shape and size changes along with the standpoint in a very orderly pattern.
- ‘It keeps on looking the same when I am static and it changes only when I change my position. With a little bit of practice, I may forecast its appearance in accordance with my relative position.’ This complete chain of sense-experiences looks orderly as well as predictable.
- The change of appearances from ‘X to Y’ and ‘Y to Z’ is not abrupt, but is connected in a series where there is slight variation and slight resemblance between ‘X and Y’ and ‘Y and Z’ and X does not change to Z abruptly and randomly. So, this change is gradual as well as regular.
- The series of my experiences has a continuity in such a way that the appearances do not vanish or manifest spontaneously from nowhere. So, there is also continuity in my experiences.
- There is always a central point from which the relative sense-experiences gradually deviate.
- Most of the times, sense-experiences work as the signs for other sense-experiences. For example, if and when my eyes provide me with appearance of a snake and if I dare go near it, there are fair chances that my fingers may touch it as well.

Therefore, our sense-experiences form an orderly, regular, gradual, predictable and systematic pattern called a *family*. Therefore, any object may be defined as nothing but a *family of sense-experiences*. In this context, Berkeley cites some examples (of deviant experiences) as follows:

**Hallucinations:** According to Berkeley, the parameter we apply to determine whether some experience is hallucination or not is to find out whether that particular sense-experience belongs to a *family* or not. In the process, we try to relate our sense-experiences with one-another and not with some external reality (in the Lockean sense). Therefore, according to Berkeley, in a case of hallucination, we can have ‘weird experiences’ but not a ‘*family of experiences*’. Those that do not belong to a *family* are called hallucinations.

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**Illusions:** Sometimes, our sense-experiences do belong to a *family*, but the qualities of some parts are at variance from some other parts within the *family* i.e. something might have the ‘quality X’ but appear to have the ‘quality Y’. For example, if we take a straight stick and immerse it in a bucket of water, it only appears to bend but the moment it is taken out of water, it again looks straight. Therefore, we have a coherent and scientific system which accounts for all facts and thereby, explains our sense-experiences.

A coin might look elliptical from different angles, yet we know that it only looks elliptical but *really* it is perfectly elliptical in shape. This is simply because we experience the circular shape as the central point of the coin’s experience and the appearance of the relative elliptical form comes from the deviation of the central point i.e. the circular shape of the coin. The same argument may be imposed in case of a pink rose which appears black when seen in a blue light. The critics may ask why should we believe that pink is the real colour of the rose (while black only appears to be so)? And if the response is that pink is the real colour because that is what is experienced in the broad daylight, then the critics may again ask why there is biasness in favour of daylight. It is simply because the broad daylight provides the condition for the *maximum possible distinction* of colours and therefore, maximum predictability of the colour (as is not possible in case of any artificial light). So, broad daylight is considered as the central point, while all other artificial or coloured lights are taken as deviations. Therefore, in every case of sense-experiences, ‘it is only that experience we have under the standard conditions that should be accepted as the decisive one’.

**Dreams:** As we have already discussed the experiences we get in hallucinations and illusions; and have tried to settle the possible doubts, still the experiences received in dreams form another case worth considering. Sometimes, all the sense-experiences occurring in dreams may form a perfectly ordered pattern and therefore, it might not be possible to reject them as ‘the failure to synchronize with the laws of nature’ (as is usually the demarcation of dreams).

One might argue that the deductions drawn from dreams are incorrect while deductions drawn from waking life are correct. Sometimes dream experiences might be as correct and vivid as the waking experiences are; and the waking experiences might be more incorrect than the dreams. One might again suggest that the real object might correspond with the waking experiences but not with the dream experiences. This argument may also be rejected on the ground that we may never be sure of the corresponding relationship between our experiences and something else, when our accessibility is limited only to our experiences. If we do so, we might go back to the Lockean problem of agnosticism. Actual difference, therefore, does not seem to be dependent on our experiences, rather on the complete context i.e. the snake in my dream may be just as clear, distinct and vivid as in the waking experience but the waking experience of the snake is arranged in a vast and all-pervading system of such interrelated sense-experiences ‘fit in’ with our other waking experiences in a predictable manner (i.e. in accordance with the law of nature). Therefore, there is not much difficulty in differentiating the dream experiences from the waking experiences.

**Esse est Percipi:** With this we come to the most important trait of subjective idealism. According to this, the physical entities are nothing but the *mutually fitting families* of predictable sense-experiences. But since the experiences cannot arise without the process of experience, therefore they cannot exist without being experienced by somebody. According to subjective idealism, existence is perception (*esse est percipi*) which means ‘to be is to be perceived’ (concerning the physical entities). According to this, if the physical entities cannot exist singly with their experience, then conglomerations of different kinds cannot do so as well. In other words, these physical entities can have no existence other than our experiences and even if they do, we cannot know anything about them.

The critics might argue that the objects in the room cannot just stop existing once we move out of the room and it seems absurd from the common-sense viewpoint that the objects in the room evaporate at the very moment we move out of the room and reappear once we reenter the room. The idealists would, however, reject this by asserting that if absolutely no one is having the experience of the object in the room, they (objects) would not exist since there cannot be any *esse* without its *percipi*.

Subjective idealism may face another criticism which is as follows:

**Causation of sense-experiences:** We must have some cause for our sense-experiences. To accept the physical object to be the cause of our sense-experiences is out of question. For then, we would fall back to the Lockean agnosticism. One explanation might assert that causality is nothing but a relationship of our sense-experiences; therefore the concept of causality cannot be applied to connect our sense-experiences with anything other than the rest of our sense-experiences. It cannot ever connect our sense-experiences with non-perceived objects, but only with other sense-experiences.

Bishop Berkeley, being a religious person, argued on a different level. He affirmed that our sense-experiences are caused by an all-pervading God who does so in such an orderly and perfect manner that we can even make forecasts on the basis of them and then propose our further course of action.

**Criticism:** With the introduction of God into the subjective idealists’ criticisms are bound to arise:

- If we are able to know only our own sense-experiences, how do we come to know that there is a God as the cause of all our experiences? Either the God is a sense-experience Himself, or He is something other than them. If we accept him as one of the sense-experiences, then the actual causality remains unexplained and if we accept God as something else, why cannot we accept the existence of external physical world on the same ground? Moreover, a sudden introduction of God in an otherwise fully logical argument seems an abrupt one.
- If we have knowledge only of our own sense-experiences, how can we ever be sure that other minds also exist? It might lead to *solipsism* (only myself-ism). That would inevitably lead to the view that only my mind and ideas exist but if such is the case, whom are we addressing to? So the second criticism is how to save Berkeley’s subjective idealism from allegation of *solipsism*.

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- We cannot have perception of the physical entities without the mind, but from these premise, it does not logically follow that what we perceive can also not exist without mind.
- Our assumption about something existing unperceived is probably the most appropriate explanation available for the certain facts or experiences. For example, in each and every perception of ours, atoms remain unobserved and most of the scientific explanations are based on the reasoning of this kind only and there seems to be no better alternative available to us.

**2. Objective Idealism:** The primary task of the idealists, here, seems to smash the primary definition of the physical entities in order to serve this purpose, a version of idealism known as ‘Objective Idealism’ is introduced. The objective idealism denies subjective idealism as to be perceived. It gives a totally different explanation of the physical world, which undeniably enables the assumption that the physical entities do exist without their perception. In this section, we shall analyze the two different accounts given by objective idealism as follows:

- **Transcendent Idealism:** Idealism took different forms in the eighteenth century with a theory of perception advanced by Immanuel Kant, which was popularly known transcendent idealism. While Berkeley believed that no material objects existed and that the physical things that appear to us are ideas and nothing more. Kant held that these appearances have their material counterparts but they are hidden permanently from our view. Kant argued that this real or *noumenal* world of things-in-themselves are permanently off-limits and that our mind could only consider the phenomenal realm or ‘how things seems’. This phenomenal world is organized into sensations or concepts and then put into a context of space-and-time by human minds.

The next period of the perceptual philosophy was nineteenth and twentieth century versions of phenomenalism. While some phenomenologists agreed with Berkeley that there is no material reality, some other agreed with Kant that there is another realm beyond the phenomena we experience. All phenomenologists hold, that whether there is a reality beyond phenomena or not, we can talk meaningfully only about the sense-data we experience.

- **Phenomenalism:** The school of phenomenalism agrees with idealism that our knowledge depends upon our sense-experiences but it does not imply that when we talk about external-physical entities, we are talking only about our sense-experiences. The phenomenologists affirm that we may also talk about the possible sense-experience (that is the sense-experiences we would be able to have provided certain conditions were fulfilled). The physical entities in fact are *families* of actual as well as possible sense-experiences. For example, when looking at a snake, one experiences actual sense-experience (of the snake), but when not looking at the snake, it still exists. This means that though one is not having the snake-experience, but could have it as it is available to experience it. If the snake runs away or is destroyed, its experiences are no longer available to us. But as-long-as it is possible to have the snake-experience, the snake still exists. We have to simply explain the

prerequisites for the experience. For example, a person may not be in the room, but can believe that the book kept on the table is still there, i.e. if the person reenters the room and have visual or tactual book-experience, then it still exists. But suppose the person finds no book when he/she reenters the room, then the statement, 'There is a book on the study table in the room' is false.

The test for the existence of the physical existence is 'not its perception, but its *perceivability*'. Therefore, the claim about the existence of a physical entity is affirmed not by 'to be is to be perceived' but by 'to be is to be perceivable'.

One of the early phenomenologists J.S. Mill puts it as 'Matter is the permanent possibility of sensations.' It is to be noted that the word 'sensation' used by Mill is somewhat different from the word 'idea' used by Locke and Berkeley. The word 'sensation' refers to 'having the experience but not what-we-experience.'

It is to be noted, that *sensing* is not the same as *perceiving*. The sense-data is *sensed*, but the physical objects are *perceived*. It is impossible to have perception without something provided to our senses. Along with the passive receiving of sense-data, there also occurs the active process called interpretation (conscious or unconscious). The moment the sense-data is made available to the senses, the process of interpretation starts. Not only this, the interpretation also assists in accessing the experience with all the apperceptive background and thus provides us with directly sensed qualities as well as those qualities which are not yet exhibited.

Other phenomenologists attempted to revisit the theory more carefully than Mill did. It would not make sense to say that when nobody perceives, merely the possibilities exist. After all, how can we express the proposition that 'the mountain exists unperceived' in terms of sense-data? The phenomenologist affirms that everything uttered about a physical entity may be translated into the statements of sense-data. But then, how is such a translation possible? A phenomenologist would say that this translation is possible, but not in terms of sense-data being sensed right now. It has to be translated into its hypothetical form.

- **Causality:** The phenomenologists face one more similar kind of problem when they ponder over sense-data in context of causality. We shall go back to our original problem—What is the cause of the sense-data? The phenomenologists would not support the response given by subjective idealists as then they have to accept 'Berkeley's God'. They cannot accept physical entities as the cause of the sense-data because their own prime objective is to discard physical entities for the sake of references to the sense-data. In this way, they go back to the sense-data again. Of course, they might say that one sense-data may cause another sense-data, but the question still remains 'What causes the first sense-data'?

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At this juncture, the twentieth century phenomenologists may assert that the whole issue has been misinterpreted: the issue has been posed as if there are two different kind of entities in this world, the sense-data and the physical entities and the task is to find out what kind of relationship is there between them? But the phenomenologists would say that this issue should not be posed in terms of relationship between two kinds of entities in this world, rather in terms of relation between two kinds of propositions:

- Sense-data statements
- Physical entities statements

Causality occurs among physical entities, and the propositions (about these entities) may be translated into the statements about sense-data. If the entities are observed, then 'X causes Y' can be easily translated into 'X is followed by Y', which may again be translated into X sense-data is regularly followed by Y sense-data. And if X and Y remain unobserved, then the phenomenologists would go back to the formation of hypothetical proposition as:

If (if we were in position 1, we would observe X) then (if we were in position 2, we would observe Y)

This whole thing may be presented in terms of sense-data (by sensation) if we were in the condition of perceiving which we are not having at the moment. So according to the phenomenism, the propositions about the physical entities may be translated into the hypothetical propositions about the sense-data.

**Phenomenalism and Laws of nature:** The next natural question is: If the phenomenism is accepted, then what would be the status of the laws of nature? Let us suppose that the law of nature affirms an invariant relation between A and B, can we say "there is an invariant relation between A sense-data and B sense-data?" But this is not so, as there is no invariant relation between sense-data. For example, 'If there is lightning, there is thunder' is believed to be true. But if only lightning is seen, then thunder will be heard is obviously not true, for one might be deaf or for any other such reason. Therefore, no invariant relation is found among sense-data. The experiences are always in fragments but the law of nature and its application is not. This law accounts for the events but not their perception. For example, the pressure of a gas is universally proportionate to its volume, all actions cause reactions, all bodies fall at a constant rate' — all these follow with absolutely no reference to the perceiver or the condition of the perceiver.

However, if the sense-data is sensed in the appropriate circumstances (i.e. if a person is not deaf or of other such exceptional case) then the condition can be represented as:

If (if condition of perception then A sense-data) then (if condition of perception then B sense-data)

Therefore, the abovementioned conditional statement may be true even though its two sub-clauses may remain unfulfilled. The existence of causality is a matter of truth of a hypothetical proposition (about sense-data) and it is not mandatory for the validity of hypothetical proposition though we may require it for its actual verification.



**CHECK YOUR PROGRESS**

4. What is metaphysical idealism? Name the two sub schools of idealism.
5. The term 'idealist' has derived from which word?
6. What is *Esse est Percipi*?

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#### **4.4 SUBSTANCE: EMPIRICISTS' AND RATIONALISTS' VIEW**

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Though the discipline of philosophy has been broadly bifurcated into metaphysics and epistemology, their respective issues are exceedingly related to each-other. While the metaphysics deals with 'what', epistemology deals with the 'knowledge of what': however, the discussion on one is bound to refer to the other. It should be noted here that the issues of 'what' are dealt with not only in the realm of metaphysics, but also in science and metaphysics. But then, how to differentiate metaphysical issues from scientific and mathematical ones? Putting it simply, the problems which may be solved by the empirical processes are the scientific ones, those resolved by the mathematical processes are the mathematical ones and the rest of them (which can neither be solved by the empirical, nor by mathematical processes) come under the purview of metaphysics. For example, the questions related to the Big-Bang, waves and particles, matter and energy are all scientific as they demand some empirical process and are therefore, considered to be scientific. However, there are some such problems which may not be resolved by these empirical evidences. For example, whether the reality is ideal or material and temporal or eternal? Such issues seem wider for empirical processes and are pertaining to the field of metaphysics. The problem of substance is one of the most significant issue discussed in the traditional metaphysics since the Greek period and none of the empirical processes seem satisfactory enough to deal with them. Though metaphysics also deals with the factual issues, but it bifurcates them into empirical and non-empirical facts. Metaphysical issues are concerned with the later one. These are such factual issues which can only be resolved by the organized working of our understanding and not the ordinary empirical processes.

**What is substance?** Our world consists of a variety of things which belong to totally diverse categories like solid, liquid or gas. However, the components of these diverse kinds of things must be relatively less and are known as the ultimate substances. These are the basic substances by the commutation and permutation of which, all the others are formed or constructed. It is these substances which undergo change in the form of events that take place in their chronological span. Now, the changes may take place only to the substances that go through the change. This means that things change, having one character at one time and a different one at another time. Events simply occur one after the other. For example, a seed may turn into a sapling, a sapling into a tree and so on. But an event like lightening may be followed by darkness or may be another lightening. Therefore, every change presumes the existence of such an eternal thing in which the changes may take place.

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**View of the Rationalists and Empiricists**

The rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, affirm that what we could get clearly with our mind does exist in the external world (i.e. outside our mind) and this substance forms the ground for the varieties of this world and their fundamental trait is that they exist by themselves totally independent of the other. The empiricists on the other hand, would pose that since our knowledge is confined to our experiences (as discussed before), the independent existence of the substance is rejected (gradually from Locke to Berkeley and then to Hume).

Each and every substance is characterized by different qualities. For example, silver may have a distinct atomic number, atomic mass, particular colour and so on. It is evident that these distinct qualities make the substance what it is and if they are removed then may be the thing would not remain the same. For example, in case of any change in atomic mass, number, colour or volume, the silver would cease to be silver anymore.

The next question would be that even if we take out some of the distinct qualities of the substance, some substance would have been left and we won't know what to call it. In case we have been able to remove all the distinct qualities of the substance, would not we be left only with nothing? But then, it has to be accepted that the qualities of the substance are not the same as the substance itself. For example, the distinct qualities of silver are not the same as the silver itself, because technically and logically, the substance *per se* has to exist before the qualities of the substance.

If somebody criticizes by asserting that a substance is nothing but the 'sum-total of its qualities', then again the question would be what does the word 'it' denotes here. There must be an 'it' which incorporates all the distinct qualities within.

Of course, the critics may assert that the word 'it' denotes nothing more than a group of qualities coexisting at a particular space and time. So the silver is nothing more than these coexisting qualities. But then, though chronologically this might be the case, but at least logically, things have to be prior to their qualities as there would be no qualities and if there are no qualities there are no things. Of course, it does not imply that the thing and its qualities can be separated, what it simply means is that the substance and its qualities are 'not separable but distinguishable'. So there cannot be any quality unless there is a thing to become the quality of.

The critics may again counter-argue that even the idea of a qualityless thing is a paradox, as there would be no thing, if there is no quality. For example, in addition to depicting the qualities of atomic mass, atomic number, and particular colour etc., what else can silver be? So whatever way we try to describe it, it would be nothing but the addition of another quality. That is why, if we remove all the qualities, we have actually no substance left with us— not even a void. However, not much importance was given to this argument as it does not refer properly to the concerned issue. A philosopher is simply concerned with the metaphysical fact that the substance must preexist if there has to be any qualities of the substance. The qualities cannot exist just in a vacuum. For example, if the ice is cold then there has

to be some ice which is cold, as the quality of coldness cannot just float in a vacuum. In fact, coldness is a quality, which always belongs to a substance (thing). It would be irrelevant to assert that there are qualities of the substance but no substance as such. A critic might argue, again, that it is nothing but the confusion posed by the simple grammatical distinction between the adjectives which depict the qualities and the noun which depict the substance. On further analysis, we find that the substances are nothing but 'a bundle of qualities'. A substance cannot merely be a bundle of qualities as apart from the *bundle* and the *bundled*. There has to be something more which ties the bundled into a bundle, that is, to make it one thing. That something which holds or ties the bundle together is the substance. So the substance is something which forms the qualities but then it is the qualities which finally determine what the substance is.

The critics however find it absurd that there is a pure substance devoid of qualities and when the qualities are imposed on it, it becomes one particular kind of substance (for example, silver) as distinct from others (for example, gold, wood, etc.). If there is a substance, it is nothing but a 'complex of coexisting qualities', the rest is a myth deliberately constructed by the philosophers.

But then we have to face another problem: How would we distinguish, for example, a ball of silver from another ball of silver of identical shape, size, colour and weight, since they possess the same qualities, it is impossible to differentiate among them at least on the basis of qualities. The only way by which we may distinguish between them is their spatio-temporal positions: we may point at one and then at the other, existing at different places or in different times. We have to admit that it is actually the substance, not the quality, which distinguishes one thing from another.

Such instances are usually not posed to us in our day-to-day experiences and a layman would hardly care whether the qualities presume the substance or substance is a combination of coexisting qualities. So, for a layman, it is simply a verbal issue but since this issue seems irresolvable on the basis of empirical evidences, the metaphysician would not waive it off simply as a verbal issue. For them, no doubt it is a factual issue about the basic substratum of the reality and it is their task to dissect the reality for analysis.

**Problem of Universals:** This problem was discussed for the first time by Plato. We often use the term 'realism' for the Platonic metaphysics. He believed that universals really exist. According to him, this reality is not only composed of the particulars, but also of the universals, shared by all the particulars. Most of the times, we use the suffixes like '-hood' and '-ness' in order to refer to the universals. For example, there might be this cow or that cow, but there has to be the universal of 'cowness' shared by all particular cows.

Plato's prime concern, however, was about the real existence of the mathematical entities and the moral qualities. For example, when we attempt to draw a perfect line or circle, we could never be sure whether it is perfect or not, as there is no perfect line or circle in nature. However, Plato would say that at least somewhere and in some form, the perfect liness or circularity must be really

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present and the currently drawn figure is an approximate figure of it. In same way, perfect moral virtues like goodness or justice do not seem to exist in this world, yet we do have an idea of perfect goodness, beauty and justice within us, which proves that they must really exist. But the question arises that what is the relationship between the universals and the particulars? While the particulars exist in space and time, universals do not. While yellow things may exist in this world, the universal of yellowness does not exist in this world, rather in some other realm of universals and all particular yellow entities are nothing but the approximation of the universals. Similarly, a perfect circle might not exist anywhere but the perfect circularity exists in the unchanging timeless realm of the universe.

Though his views about universals have not been coherent enough, but we find at least two particular views in his works:

- Archetypes
- Participation

**1. Archetype:** One of the views expressed in Plato's early work accepts this relationship between universals and particulars to be that of the relationship between the original and its copy. So there might be all the imperfect lines in this world, but there must be a perfect line somewhere and all the lines in this world are the imperfect copies of that perfect line.

Some critics have rejected this idea on the ground that such an archetype would still be a particular. Of course, it would be perfect but still a particular, so the archetype theory cannot be accepted as the theory of universals.

**2. Participation:** Another significant view expressed in the Platonic dialogues is that every particular participated in the universal. The word 'participation' is used in the sense of covering all the individuals under it.

However, critics have rejected this idea as well on the ground that the thing 'participated in' is as much a particular as the thing 'doing the participation'; therefore, this is also not a satisfactory account for the theory of universals.

It might be the case that the prime concern of Plato was only to establish a theory of universals along with a two-world explanation of it but his explanation seems unsatisfactory. The only justification might be that— this is a unique kind of relation where a particular represents a universal just as a triangle represents the triangularity. So the relationship between particular and universal can only be that of the representation. Plato further adds the relational quality (e.g. that of largeness, nearness, etc.) and thus, universals may further be divided into qualities (yellowness, cowness, etc.) and relations (e.g. larger than, being near to, etc.). Both qualities and relations have their own examples and therefore, both are considered as universals.

The universals do have an existence totally different from particulars and they would continue to exist even if there are no particulars. For example, we may understand what the term 'Martians' or 'Phoenix' means, even though there are no real Martians or Phoenix anywhere—we don't find any particular examples of them and still the universals exist, in Plato's own words, 'waiting to be exemplified.' So

the universals cannot be perceived with our senses in the way the particulars can. Still they are as objectively real as the particulars are.

However, the Platonic dualism was unacceptable to Aristotle, who too was a realist but believed that the universals really exist along with the particulars (and not in our minds). According to Aristotle, a universal is nothing else but simply a quality commonly shared by a number of examples and the concept of these universals can only be arrived at by the method of abstraction, as the particulars are dependent upon the universals so the universals are also dependent upon the particulars. Therefore, no universal can exist apart from the particulars.

The only difference that the Aristotelian theory has is that, the universals belong to the things not as archetypes but as objectively existing qualities of the things. A universal is such a quality that is present identically in each and every particular that forms an example of it.

**Nominalist theory:** The views provided by Plato and Aristotle could be understood more clearly if seen in the backdrop of other theories prevalent about the universals. The above mentioned description of the problem seems to include a lot of myths and ambiguity. It may be said that in the universe, nothing really exists apart from the particulars. It is only the particulars that we perceive and therefore, it is only the particulars that really exist. Of course, there are qualities, but they are nothing but a part of things and cannot be distinguished from them, neither in the Platonic terms nor in the Aristotelian terms. So, there might be a yellow flower, yellow candy or a yellow dress, but no yellowness as such.

One of the most renowned theories in this context is known as nominalism. It has been divided into two sub schools:

- Extreme nominalism
- Imagism

1. **Extreme Nominalism:** Extreme nominalism would hold that only the particulars really exist in this world and the common quality which all the particulars (belonging to a distinct class) possess is nothing but a name we have deliberately assigned to them. Therefore, a universal should be understood only as a name which refers to nothing but a collection of particulars.

The critics would pose following arguments to nullify this theory:

- When we name a variety of particular things as yellow, we are not referring to particulars *per se*, but some distinct quality of them, that is not the same as the particulars (e.g. a flower is yellow but not the same as yellow)
- It is not the case that all cows have only one commonality and that is the name 'cow', rather we have a variety of particulars in the same class because of some common quality which is the defining trait of the class. These qualities do not exist only in our minds but also in reality. There may not be only one quality or one set of qualities characterizing all the particulars in a class. There may also be overlapping qualities which decide the imposition of the name. In fact, we cannot evade qualities simply by substituting name.

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**2. Imagism:** The other view is called Imagism. According to this view, mere particulars have the real existence, what we have in mind is not the concepts but only their images. In this context, Bishop Berkeley asserts that ‘While I think of triangle, I always have an image of some triangle in my mind. But this cannot be understood as the concept of triangle (that is, triangularity).’ For then, this concept has to include the idea of either equilateral, Isosceles or any other. Once we have the image of a triangle in our mind, it has to be a distinct kind of triangle that is either equilateral or isosceles, etc. After all, we cannot have such an image of triangle which is neither equilateral nor isosceles (though the concept can). But here Berkeley might face a problem: Of course, an image of a triangle may represent all the geometrical figures ‘of the same kind’, but then what does the term ‘the same kind’ stands for. For this, we have to admit some concept of triangularity in our mind and obviously, this kind is not the same as image. Therefore, this view of imagism does not go much far and again, it is to be admitted that there has to be concepts and not only images.

**Conceptualism:** This viewpoint was put forward by John Locke and it affirms that a universal is neither only a name nor only an image, but a concept. The particulars may exist in reality (nature) but the concepts exist in our minds and we use ‘general words’ for them. But then, whenever we use a general word, we are bound to do so, on the basis of some common properties present in all the particulars of the class and then we have to go back to the concepts of concepts.

**Resemblance (Similarity):** It seems, that Aristotle’s viewpoint fared much better when he affirmed that there can be no universal above and beyond the particulars. Universals are the common qualities and they do exist in reality. But then the question might arise that how can a quality be present in each and every particular identically. For example, there may be a variety of particulars with yellowness as the concept, but then there are innumerable shades of yellow which are distinct from each-other, and still we call all such particulars as yellow, because all the shades have similarity with each other and distinction from all other colours.

Conclusively, it may be said that there are particulars and their qualities (universals) in reality, and when we refer to a variety of things sharing the same quality, we should not jump to the conclusion that the same quality is prevailing identically in all the things, rather there are sufficient similarities, resemblance between them which make us impose a single word for all of them. Such similarities are not a construction of our minds, but are actually ‘out there’. Our categorization and classification of such qualities is a combined effort of nature and our minds. Therefore, the similarities are present in the nature but their use to construct a conceptual framework depends on us.

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7. What are ultimate substance?
8. Who was the first to discuss the problem of universals and what was his belief?
9. Name the two sub schools of nominalism.

**NOTES****4.5 CAUSALITY**

The theory of causality has a significant role to play both in philosophy and science. Neither the science nor the practical man can ever possibly discard this theory. It is expected, not only in science but also in our practical life that we should move beyond observed facts and attempt to get inferences from it. This may happen as generalization or prediction. In order to take any practical and sensible step from our observations to the unobserved cases, it is necessary that we accept the concept of causation.

In the history of modern philosophy, the *apriori* acceptability of the universal principle that ‘all events have some cause’ was universally accepted and this concept of causality was hardly ever-doubted. Even skeptics like Hume did not discard it (as is usually believed to be), rather he only posed the philosophical problem which would make its justification (or defense) almost impossible.

In scientific terms, the fundamental meaning of causation would be that ‘the repeated happening of a particular kind of events under particular context would assure the happening of the same kind of events again if provided the same kind of contexts’. This is the minimum presumption which we should have in order to make any scientific theory.

Keeping the abovementioned points in mind, three significant theories explain the concept of causality. These are:

- Theory of Regularity
- Theory of Entailment
- Activity Theory

**4.5.1 Theory of Regularity**

This theory starts with an analysis of the term ‘cause’ and its meaning. An empiricist would identify causation with something which can be empirically observed, though they have to accept the presumption of at least one minimal principle, that of regularity. The regularity view or the ‘regular sequencing’ simply means that if P and Q stand for two events and if ‘P causes Q’ then it indubitably means that ‘Q shall follow P’. It may be represented as given follows:

Causation (Empirical observation) = ‘Regular Sequencing’ of P & Q = If Q follows P, then P is the cause of Q

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As might be understood, this is not the common-sense view, because if it were so, then the causal relation between the fire and the heat (which follows it) would be the same as the relation between the fire and the burn (which may or may not follow). Thereby, it is evident that this regularity theory stands in stark opposition to the common-sense theory regarding causation. Despite this, the common-sense theory seems more acceptable these days as it goes well with the modern empiricism. This is because it accepts causation as ‘empirically observable phenomena’ and eliminates its *apriori* aspect. It establishes at least one minimum consensus— in the physical world, we do not and cannot find any intelligible connection between cause and effect. For example, a person may affirm that a particular kind of wood burns more rapidly than the other kinds and we can find that it is true, but we cannot find any reason why it is so.

**Criticisms:** However, this theory might appear less acceptable in some other instances:

- Firstly, it seems less feasible if we refer to the causation of only a single occurrence. Therefore, if one says that ‘I made the room warm by putting a fire in the room’ then it would mean ‘putting fire in the room was followed by the presence of warmth in the room’ and that the second occurrence would naturally follow the first. But in case of more complex events, the difficulty would become apparent: If one says ‘the German racist policy became the cause of the Second World War’ then though the war *actually* followed it, but it would be absurd to accept that every war is followed by racist policy.
- Secondly, there might be some case of regularity which could not be acceptable as the case of causation. For example, the ringing of the bell in the traditional kitchen may be understood as an invitation to all family members to gather for dinner. However, the ringing of bell followed by the gathering cannot be accepted as the case of causation simply because such a regular sequencing may not be followed in most of the modern houses where all the family members take their dinner at their own suitability and convenience.
- Though the abovementioned difficulties may be explained by making slight rectifications in the theory, the other difficulties seem more radical to be compromised by minor adjustments in the theory. The theory seems totally useless in the instances from psychology. For example, my belief may be followed by some rational process, but surely my psyche is *actually* decided by several other factors (like my mental state, personal prejudices and of course, the rational process). In such cases, therefore, it would not be possible to accept the belief to be followed by the rational process only.

### 4.5.2 Theory of Entailment

Due to the abovementioned difficulties, it might seem problematic to accept the regularity theory whole-heartedly. Its simplicity and proximity to the empirical observations may not be enough to compromise with these difficulties. Therefore,



besides the regularity theory, we have to introduce other notions like ‘necessity’ and ‘determination’ as well. We have to search for the necessary connection between the cause and effect. If the conclusion is followed logically from the available premises, it is simply because the premises are so necessarily connected with the conclusion that the premises cannot ever even occur without the occurrence of the conclusion. This is called the *logical necessity*. The theory which demands a relation of *logical necessity* between the cause and the effect is called the entailment theory of causation. Here, the logical term ‘entailment’ refers to such a relation between the premises and the conclusion that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. Sometimes, this theory is also called the rationalists’ theory of causation. It can be represented as follows:

Causation (Logical relation) = ‘Necessary’ and ‘determinant’ relation between  
P & Q = If Q occurs only-and-only then P is the cause of Q

Though the entailment theory of causation is propounded by the philosophers, it seems close to the common-sense view. This theory was accepted by almost all philosophers up to the nineteenth century and the first thinker to doubt it was David Hume and though the grounds proposed by him were not acceptable to all, today the regularity theory seems preferable over the entailment one.

**Arguments in support of the entailment theory:** There are two main arguments in support of entailment theory:

- In order to make any legitimate inference from cause to effect, we have to accept that ‘the cause entails the effect’. This may not be exactly as it happens in the field of logic; however it seems similar to the formal logic up to the point where it justifies the following effect. Otherwise, if we make any attempt to reach conclusion from such premises which are not adequate enough to entail the conclusion, then our whole argument would seem absurd. In order to avoid such discrepancy, most of the thinkers believe in the entailment theory. It does not mean that we have to deliberately presume this theory before we are assured that the conclusion is justified: it only means that if the conclusion is to be justified, we have to logically presume this theory.
- The regularity theory and its examples are nothing but the ‘facts of experience’. For example, the gravitational force of earth is the cause for the falling of any solid object. If this explanation is not accepted, then such occurrences have to be explained every time, as sheer cases of coincidences happening again-and-again.

If the phenomena of causation is defined merely as a regular sequencing of events, then ‘P is the cause of Q’ would simply mean that ‘Q succeeds P’, but this is not an adequate explanation for why this occurrence is taking place time-and-again? It is only if the cause P provides an adequate reason for the effect Q, that it will be able to explain the consistent and repeated occurrences, while the alternative of regularity shrinks to sheer coincidence (and thereby unacceptable), so the entailment seems the only viable explanation available to us.

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**Arguments against the entailment theory:** But the critics may ask that if the nature of the cause does not incorporate the effect within it, how can it provide a reason for the effect? This criticism may be clearly formulated in the form of following objections against entailment:

- As far as the physical world is concerned, we do not find any logical relation between cause and effect. We are not able to find the reason why it is only fossil fuel which ignites the fire and it is only water which extinguishes it and not vice-versa. No doubt, the scientist may attempt to explain it as interpolation between the atoms but still what they are giving is nothing but simply a generalization based on experiences and they are still not able to explain why it happens so? In fact, none of the causal laws pertaining to the physical world seem to be logically necessary and none of them can be proved *apriori* (as happens in mathematics), we only establish some empirical generalizations. On the other hand, the laws of mathematics are logically necessary, *apriori*, are not established empirically and are believed to be the same since times immemorial.
- Most of the instances of necessary relation occur simultaneously but in different times. Though it does not reject the entailment outright, but at least lessens the possibility of a necessity between the cause and the effect.
- The contention that certainty can only be achieved in *apriori* reasoning, while probability is what we achieve in the causal reasoning is further objected. The reason of this objection is that, firstly we don't know the complete cause and secondly, we are never sure whether the whole cause entails the whole effect (or a part of it). Also, we may never be able to observe the necessary condition, even if it exists. Thereby, we are compelled to follow the inductive process which gives us *only probability but no certainty*.

As is seen, the cause and effect are two totally different events and they cannot be connected necessarily unless we accept that some propositions are *apriori* in the case. But the moment we attempt to impose analytical property on such causal proposition, it becomes merely a verbal problem.

Now, the acceptance or rejection of the entailment theory depends more-or-less on our attitude towards induction. Several modern logicians have attempted to explain the problem of induction without accepting the entailment and have not succeeded so far. The main problem, here, is that no possible explanation can ever be given for accepting that 'P followed by Q' will take place in future as well. None of the modern logicians have been able to present the justification of such induction without the admittance of entailment theory.

It may be argued that induction might not be rational in the specific sense in which deduction is, but they are rational in some other sense. However, it is the minimum requirement that if an inferential process is to be valid, the conclusion must come from the premises but this can happen only by the admittance of entailment in the process. Moreover, these thinkers have not been able to define what being 'rational in some other ways' means. If it is accepted as *practical utility* (as some

logicians have said), then it becomes difficult that it was practically useful in past and will be so in future as well.

It appears, therefore, that the entailment theory takes a strong hold on causation. The modern-day philosophers accept it to be significant metaphysically, but still considers it to be a contentious issue. There has been radical difference of opinion, between those thinkers who accept the world as a well-connected rational system and those who simply accept it as the chaotic complex of facts. While the former have been looking for unity of things, the later look for the plurality in the world. In order to accept the world as a unified and coherent logical system, the entailment theory seems unavoidable to us.

### 4.5.3 Activity Theory

Apart from the regularity and entailment view, a third theory is also considered by the metaphysician, generally called the activity theory. Advocates of this theory propose that the concept of causation can only be explained on the basis of the 'notion of will'. Such a view was introduced by Bishop George Berkeley, who proposed that a cause produce an effect only if it is 'active'. Thus, this view presumes activity involves willingness. Berkeley asserted that being containing will can be the only possible cause. By this, he attempted to establish the existence of God as the direct cause for all those things which cannot be attributed to the human mind. It can be represented as follows:

Causation (Active relation) = 'Active' relation between P & Q = If Q is induced by the active will of P, then P is the cause of Q

Some other thinkers like John Locke, though accepted physical things as the seeming cause, emphasized that every causation involves will and therefore, the final cause has to be the mind (or the spirit). According to this view, any physical object cannot produce change or motion by itself. It presumes the will of some mind or spirit (outside it) for any change to take place. In this way, the activity theory may provide ground for the existence of God for the initiation of the original momentum (God as the *prime mover*).

There may be some other explanations of the activity theory not involving the existence of God. According to this view, though causation is not the rational and conscious desire for change but a semi-conscious inclination towards it usually contained in the semi-conscious beings like the lower animals. This may get away with the theism of Berkeley and thereby establish *panpsychism*. This may also be explained as the inclination towards activity involved in causation as a quality (which we do experience sometime as the case may be), which usually goes unexperienced. It may take place in the unanimated objects in the form of 'essence' as the absolutely unconscious causality.

This activity theory has sometimes been associated and used as a better alternative for the entailment theory. In modern philosophy, Professor V. Stout has argued that the entailment theory is present in some inclinations for consequences.

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It works for the whole process, not only for the cause. Thus, it may take the form of an argument customized either for *panpsychism* or for theism. The only problem we face in this argument is to ensure that the cause entails the effect only and only if some inclinations for consequences are supposedly present. The presence of some causal connection in such examples does not prove that this inclination is applicable only in such cases.

The critics may oppose the acceptability of activity theory as an alternative to the entailment theory because they hold that the effect necessarily follows the cause in the sense of being forced by the cause, not in the sense of being entailed by it. Thereby, the cause may be inferred from the effect in the same way as the effect from the cause. So, if the process accepts entailment then it has to accept that not only the cause entails the effect but also the effect entails the cause. In practical life, we do conceive the future as shaped by the past events but we never think of the past as being shaped by future. For example, if a person injures somebody with a weapon, then it would be an obvious belief that the weapon, in a sense, would produce the injury, but it would seem utter absurd if it is believed that the injury produced the weapon. This is because the phenomenon of causation is indubitably accepted as unidirectional and irreversible. Since, it is not possible to present arguments that the element in our normal understanding of causation shall also impose on real world. Therefore, the activity theory cannot be explained sufficiently.

**Formation of the idea of causation:** The next question would naturally be ‘how do we form the idea of causation?’ There are three possible views as given below:

- According to the regularity theory, the response would be quite obvious. The causation is nothing but the observation of ‘regular sequencing’.
- According to the entailment theory, the explanation is a bit complicated. Most of the times, we do derive our ideas from observations and imply them on such cases where the direct observation is not possible, but still presume that the entailment is working. In other words, the element of entailment in the common-sense theory is formed by the analogy of no-causal explanations, where we do observe entailment.
- According to the activity theory, causation is believed to be derived from our experience for explanations. For example, when one deliberately moves the hand, they are consciously aware of the inclination to move the hand. This particular example may be criticized on the ground that the inclination does not directly cause the movement of the hand, but this happens through several intermediary neurons present in our systems. Therefore, it is almost impossible to believe that ‘P causes S’, because P is causing the intermediary term Q and Q, in turn, is causing R and then at last, R is causing S. Therefore, it is almost impossible to observe any direct linkage between P and S.

### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

10. What is the fundamental meaning of causation?
11. What do the advocates of activity theory propose?

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## 4.6 SUMMARY

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- A common man who has not pondered over the issues related to perception, the reality of the physical world and has accepted them *as they are*, is termed as 'realist'.
- Realism is the indubitable belief in the existence of the physical world—whether we perceive it or not. It is the belief that several things may be known about this physical world.
- The general sense of the word 'naive' is having ingenious and unsophisticated simplicity of nature. It is a simplistic, unaffected and direct style of thinking with little or no use of technicalities of the discipline.
- Representative Realism was expounded by John Locke. This sub school of realism developed on the belief that though there are physical objects existing independently of our sense experiences, but they are not exactly like what they appear to us.
- The primary qualities of physical objects are those qualities which exist independently of any sense perception. In other words, they would be there even if there were no perceivers around in general, these are *measurable* qualities.
- Berkeley believed that the secondary qualities are inseparable from the primary ones, i.e. if the physical object does not have one then it cannot have the other. For example, the shape and colour of a physical object are inseparable qualities.
- The metaphysical school of idealism stands quite opposite to realism. It holds that it is the ideas (and not the sense-experiences) which make up the fundamental reality.
- The word 'idealist' is derived from the word 'idea' meaning 'all that exists is mind and its ideas, and there is no external existence'. According to idealism, it is not the case that the physical objects exist first and then comes their sensation (which resembles or copies the object). There is only the sensation of objects existing inside the mind.
- Causality plays a significant role in both philosophy and science.
- It is expected, not only in science but also in our practical life that we should move beyond observed facts and attempt to get inferences from it. This may happen as generalization or prediction.
- In order to take any practical and sensible step from our observations to the unobserved cases, it is utmost necessary that we accept the concept of causation.
- In the history of modern philosophy, the *apriori* acceptability of the universal principle that 'all events have some cause' is universally accepted.

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- In scientific terms, the fundamental meaning of causation would be that ‘the repeated happening of a particular kind of events under particular context would assure the happening of the same kind of events again provided they have the same kind of contexts’. This is the minimum presumption which we should have in order to make any scientific theory.

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### 4.7 KEY TERMS

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- **Representative Realism:** Expounded by John Locke believe that though there are physical objects existing independently of our sense experiences, but they are not exactly like what they appear to us.
- **Realism:** It is the indubitable belief in the existence of the physical world.
- **Idealism:** This school believes that it is the ideas (and not the sense-experiences) which make up the fundamental reality.

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### 4.8 ANSWERS TO ‘CHECK YOUR PROGRESS’

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1. Realism is the indubitable belief in the existence of the physical world—whether we perceive it or not. It is the belief that several things may be known about this physical world.
2. The two sub schools of realism are (i) Naïve Realism and (ii) Representative Realism
3. Representative Realism was expounded by John Locke. This sub school of realism developed on the belief that though there are physical objects existing independently of our sense experiences, but they are not exactly like what they appear to us.
4. The metaphysical school of idealism holds that it is the ideas (and not the sense-experiences) which make up the fundamental reality. The metaphysical school of idealism is divided into two sub schools (i) Subjective Idealism (ii) Objective Idealism
5. The word ‘idealist’ is derived from the word ‘idea’ meaning ‘all that exists is mind and its ideas, and there is no external existence’.
6. According to *Esse est Percipi*, physical entities are nothing but the *mutually fitting families* of predictable sense-experiences.
7. Our world consists of a variety of things which belong to totally diverse categories like solid, liquid or gas. However, the components of these diverse kinds of things must be relatively less and are known as the ultimate substances.
8. Problem of Universals was discussed for the first time by Plato. He believed that universals really exist.
9. Nominalism has been divided into two sub schools: (i) Extreme nominalism (ii) Imagism.

10. In scientific terms, the fundamental meaning of causation would be that ‘the repeated happening of a particular kind of event under particular context would assure the happening of the same kind of events again if provided the same kind of contexts’.
11. Advocates of activity theory propose that the concept of causation can only be explained on the basis of the ‘notion of will’.

**NOTES**


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## 4.9 QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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**Short-Answer Questions**

1. Why do phenomenologists prefer the term ‘sense-data’ over the terms like sense-experience and sensations?
2. We can know only our own states of consciousness. Which school supports this viewpoint and how?
3. Write a short note on Idealism and Realism.
4. How is Entailment theory governed by the notions of necessity and determinism?
5. What is the Activity theory of causality?

**Long-Answer Question**

1. What is wrong with the subjective idealists’ assertion that the touch-object is the real object” (if any)? Justify your view.
2. Do you think that touching, tasting, smelling, etc. may be considered adequate evidences for the confirmed knowledge of the external-physical objects (like mountain, trees, rivers etc.)? Justify your response.
3. Our common-sense view does not go well with causation as the regular sequencing of events. Why? Discuss with suitable examples.
4. If a phenomenologist says ‘There is night in Antarctica now’ then he would mean ‘If I was in Antarctica now, I would have perceived ...’. But since no one is there now, so how do I know? Explain.
5. Discuss the criticisms of phenomenism based on misinterpretation.

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## 4.10 FURTHER READING

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- Chakraborty, S.P. 1979. *An Introduction to General Philosophy*. Prentice Hall: Delhi.
- Sosa, Ernest, Kim Jaegwon (Ed). 2000. *Epistemology: An Anthology*. US: Wiley-Blackwell.

